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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Some time ago I faced the decision to either start a Ph.D. or to continue 
working for an international company. After three years of practical work 
experience, I was clearly aware of the opportunity costs of higher education. 
However, I faced uncertainty about both short-term effort costs and long-term labor 
market benefits. The decision about whether or not to return to academia is an 
illustrative example of what economists call a “human capital investment decision.” 
As in this example, human capital investment decisions are typically made under 
uncertainty. 
This doctoral thesis builds upon a large literature that views educational 
decisions as human capital investments resembling investments in physical or 
financial capital. Human capital theory, as pioneered by Becker (1962) and Schultz 
(1961), states that individuals will invest in human capital only if the expected rate of 
return exceeds the costs of investment. No matter who makes the educational 
decision (e.g., students, parents, or employers) and no matter when it is taken, it 
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remains an intertemporal choice that requires tradeoffs over time: whereas costs 
typically occur in the short-run, benefits of the human capital investments are 
generally reaped with a considerable time lag. Given that not only the benefits of the 
human capital investment but also the short-term costs are imperfectly foreseeable, 
these investments are subject to considerable uncertainty. This has been 
acknowledged ever since the theoretical contributions by Levhari and Weiss (1974) 
and Williams (1979). 
There is a wealth of theoretical literature on human capital investment 
decisions under uncertainty. However, numerous fundamental empirical questions 
still remain unsolved. In particular, there is a lack of research on human capital 
investment decisions accounting for individual differences in both preferences and 
behavior patterns. The aim of this thesis is thus to provide an elaborate empirical 
examination of whether, and if so, how individual differences in preferences and 
behavior patterns lead to differences in human capital investment decisions. In doing 
so, the thesis focuses on two important decision makers, who deal with uncertainty of 
educational investments in different environments. The first two chapters focus on 
the human capital investment decisions of students in formal schooling, i.e., in upper 
secondary vocational education. The third chapter shifts the focus from students to 
employers who are the main providers of continuing, work-related training—a still 
formal educational investment, although it does not lead to an official educational 
degree.  
Both students and employers clearly face considerable uncertainty when 
investing in human capital. Typically, students face uncertainty regarding short-term 
investment costs (i.e., direct effort and indirect opportunity costs) and deferred 
investment benefits (i.e., expected advantageous labor market outcomes). A main 
source of uncertainty lies in their future academic performance and thus their time 
and effort to be devoted to future learning activities. Like students, employers also 
experience uncertainty when investing in the continuing training of their workers. A 
major source of uncertainty is the period in which employers reap the benefits, i.e., 
workers’ future working time volume with the firm—an unknown from an 
employer’s perspective. Examining educational decisions of both students and 
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employers thus is an important prerequisite for contributing to the understanding of 
educational investments under uncertainty. Whether, and if so, how heterogeneities 
in individual preferences and behavior patterns lead to differences in the educational 
investments of these two decision makers is carefully examined in the following 
three chapters of this thesis. The next three paragraphs provide a comprehensive 
overview of the individual research questions addressed, present the data used, and 
give a brief preview of the results. 
Given the considerable heterogeneity in time preferences among students 
(Bettinger and Slonim, 2007; Castillo et al., 2011), the first chapter explores the 
relation between students’ degrees of patience and their probability of dropping out 
of education. While schooling costs and benefits are uncertain before the start of an 
educational program, after enrollment, students not only accumulate human capital 
but also reduce their uncertainty about costs and benefits of schooling. Incorporating 
this new information, students reconsider their initial educational investment 
decision (Manski, 1989; Altonji, 1993). Theoretically, the outcome of the 
reconsidered decision is determined by students’ time preferences: Depending on 
their degrees of patience, discounted benefits accruing from graduation may or may 
not outweigh current and near future costs of schooling. This relationship has not yet 
been empirically examined, most likely because objective measures of students’ time 
preferences are not easily available. To understand the role of time preferences in 
explaining why students leave an educational program before graduation, we 
collected a unique data set on students in vocational education and training programs. 
This specific data set allows us to combine objective, experimental measures of time 
preferences with real-world observations of student outcomes. Analyzing the data, 
we find that the degree of patience is a robust predictor of dropout behavior: Patient 
students, i.e., students with low discount rates, have a lower probability of dropping 
out of education compared to less patient students.  
The first chapter demonstrates the importance to account for time preference 
heterogeneity in the analysis of dropout behavior. Consequently, in the second 
chapter, in the analysis of students’ school performances, we continue to account for 
preference heterogeneity. While the results in the first chapter suggest that less 
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patient students are not sufficiently sensitive to long-term schooling benefits, the 
second chapter examines whether short-term financial incentives are a means of 
bridging the gap.  
More precisely, the second chapter investigates the effect of financial 
incentives on student performance and assesses whether, and if so, how the program 
effect depends on economic preferences. With the provision of short-term financial 
incentives, part of the investment benefits can be reaped much closer to the 
investment and with a relatively higher certainty (Levhari and Weiss, 1974; Blinder 
and Weiss, 1976). Because financial incentives thus particularly target the needs of 
students who are either less patient or less risk loving, we expect the effect of 
financial incentives in education to interact with students’ time and risk preferences. 
While a fair amount of studies on the pure effect of financial incentive programs on 
student performance exist, little is known about these heterogeneous incentive 
effects. The second chapter contributes to the research on financial incentives in 
education using the self-collected data set on students in vocational education and 
training programs. Empirical evidence shows that financial incentives have on 
average a positive effect on student performance. In particular, the evidence suggests 
that highly impatient students respond strongly to financial incentives by increasing 
their student performance more than patient students. Same as the first chapter, thus 
also the second chapter provides strong evidence for individual preferences being 
related to how students decide about their human capital investments.  
Clearly, individuals not only differ in their preferences but also their 
behavior patterns. As these types of differences continue to exist in the labor market, 
the third chapter turns the focus to the examination of how (unobservable) 
differences in behavior patterns among workers affect employers’ decisions about 
training provision. A major source of uncertainty in employers’ decisions about 
whether or not to provide training to their workers refers to their return period, i.e., 
workers’ future working time volume with the firm. To overcome this uncertainty, 
employers use observable indicators predicting their return period. As part-time 
workers typically spend less time in the labor market, part-time employment status is 
a reliable indicator for a lower return period. Not surprisingly, existing literature on 
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training persistently finds that training participation is lower for part-time than for 
full-time workers (for an overview see Blundell et al., 1996). However, how the 
uncertainty and the usage of such indicators might cause systematic differences in 
the provision of training for female and male workers in part-time and full-time 
employment is unknown. This difference, however, is important to be investigated 
given the highly unequal distribution of part-time participation between female and 
male workers. To close the research gap on gender differences in the part-time/full-
time training gap, the third chapter draws on both human capital and statistical 
discrimination theory and exploits a rich Swiss data set. The empirical evidence 
shows that the part-time training gap differs by gender suggesting that the 
unobservability of behavior patterns among part-time workers affects employers’ 
training decisions differently depending on the gender of their workers.  
Drawing an overall conclusion, this thesis clearly shows that in the analysis 
of educational investment decisions under uncertainty it is necessary to account for 
heterogeneities in both preferences and behavior patterns among individuals. The 
following three chapters draw detailed conclusions for each research question. The 
final chapter highlights the major contributions by summarizing the results and their 
potential policy implications. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
 
WHAT DOES EXPERIMENTAL DATA 
ON TIME PREFERENCES REVEAL 
ABOUT REAL-WORLD DROPOUT 
BEHAVIOR? 
 
 
 
1.1  Introduction 
Given the positive outcomes related to a more highly educated population, 
the extensive research on dropout behavior is no surprise (see Krueger and Lindahl, 
2001). The commonly identified reasons why students discontinue their educational 
programs are broad, including factors related to both student characteristics and the 
institutional environment (for an overview and particular examples, see Bound and 
Turner, 2011 or Rumberger, 2001). Empirical studies recently conducted by 
economists (Eckstein and Wolpin, 1999; Oreopoulos, 2007) contribute to the 
understanding of dropout behavior referring to differences in student characteristics. 
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These scholars1 suggest that (among the many factors) the underestimation of 
lifetime benefits from staying in school plays a pivotal role in explaining why 
students leave an educational program before graduation.  
Less well explored is the underlying reason, i.e., the source of this 
underestimation of schooling benefits and its consequent dropout behavior. The 
underestimation may stem from students’ lack of information about schooling 
benefits, their inabilities to foresee delayed gratification, or their high time 
preferences (i.e., their high discount rates). Given that time preferences vary 
considerably among students (Bettinger and Slonim, 2007; Castillo et al., 2011), time 
preference heterogeneity is a natural assumption and thus of particular interest for 
any analysis of dropout behavior. Yet previous studies on schooling outcomes either 
treat time preference heterogeneity as unobserved (e.g., Eckstein and Wolpin, 1999), 
assume that other parameters represent initial preferences (e.g., parental income, see 
Card, 1995), or completely neglect time preference heterogeneity in their analyses. In 
this study, we have an objective behavioral measure of students’ time preferences 
available and are thus able to examine whether high time preferences may be an 
underlying reason why students leave an educational program before graduation.  
This chapter investigates whether students’ degrees of patience predict their 
dropout behavior. To empirically investigate this relationship we collect a 
comprehensive data set that is unique in its combination of experimentally elicited 
data on students’ time preferences and real-world data on students’ schooling 
outcomes: First, for the outcome, we observe whether students drop out or continue 
three to four-year educational programs. Second, using standard decision-making 
designs, we grasped the rare opportunity to elicit measures of time preferences 
                                                
1 Oreopoulos (2007) studies the effect of compulsory schooling laws on school attainment. His 
findings demonstrate that the overall benefits accruing from graduation are substantial. Consequently, 
he assumes that schooling costs on their own are unlikely to cause dropout behavior. He suggests that 
ignorance or the heavy discounting of substantial lifetime gains generated by additional schooling 
might explain dropout behavior. Similarly, Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) empirically investigate school 
persistence, estimating a sequential model (a methodology that treats initial traits as unobserved). 
Their model provides a number of reasons for why students leave an educational program before 
graduation; one of them being that dropouts might have lower expectations about the rewards from 
graduation. Both of these studies thus share the conclusion that “dropouts” differ systematically from 
“stayers” in how they perceive the rewards of completed education. The underlying reason for this 
difference in perception of rewards, however, has not yet been investigated. 
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directly in classrooms when our student sample started their educational programs at 
an average age of 16. Our student sample takes part in vocational education and 
training programs—the most attended upper secondary educational program among 
youths in Switzerland. Although schooling at this stage is no longer compulsory, 
graduating from upper secondary education is crucially important both for successful 
entrance into the labor market and for long-run labor market benefits. 
By showing that students’ degrees of patience significantly determine their 
probability of dropping out, our empirical results deepen our understanding of the 
underlying reason for dropout behavior. Patient students, i.e., students with low 
discount rates, have a lower probability of dropping out of school than relatively less 
patient students. Because less patient students highly discount deferred schooling 
outcomes of completed education, i.e., lack the ability (or willingness) to forgo 
immediate gratification for future consumption, long-term schooling benefits less 
likely offset their short-term schooling costs. For policy makers who tackle the 
problem of upper secondary school dropouts, our finding adds a new dimension 
suggesting that interventions should also factor in the weakness of less patient 
students to wait for gratification. 
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 1.2 provides the hypothesis. 
Section 1.3 presents the data, describes the key variables, and gives descriptive 
statistics. Section 1.4 presents the empirical strategy. Section 1.5 links students’ 
dropout behavior with their behavior in the experiments. Section 1.6 concludes. 
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1.2  Dropping out: A reconsideration of the schooling decision 
The human capital theory (originated by Becker, 1962 and Schultz, 1961) 
provides a straightforward economic model to analyze educational investment 
decisions: Individuals only invest in their own education if the expected present 
discounted value of the benefits is higher than (or at least equal to) the expected 
present discounted value of the costs of schooling. The original human capital model 
implicitly assumes that the consequent outcome of a schooling decision is 
graduation. Learning and thus revising educational decisions is not built into the 
original model.  
Manski (1989) and Altonji (1993) augment the original model by 
accounting for the option of decision revisions. In their work on schooling 
investment decisions, students decide about their schooling investments not only 
before starting a new educational program but also while they are attending it.2 
Differences between these decisions reflect information updates that students receive 
while attending school. Becoming aware of the real effort costs of learning, gaining a 
profound insight into a certain occupation and profession, or finding out about the 
opportunity costs of studying (e.g., wages of unskilled workers) exemplify 
information updates that students receive while pursuing a particular education. 
Incorporating this new information, students reconsider their educational investment 
strategy and thus their decision about whether or not to continue schooling. 
Not continuing schooling, i.e., dropping out of an educational program, 
becomes the optimal strategy whenever the sum of the schooling costs (i.e., current 
costs plus expected discounted value of the costs of the additional years of schooling) 
exceeds the sum of the schooling benefits (i.e., current benefits plus expected 
discounted value of the long-term benefits).3 Just as the original decision (about 
whether or not to make a schooling investment), the decision about whether or not to 
                                                
2 Recent empirical evidence confirms this purely theoretical contribution by showing that students 
sequentially update information and make—and in some cases revise—investment decisions 
throughout their years of education (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2012; Zafar, 2011). 
3 From a student perspective, the dropout behavior is reasonable at the time, although, in the long-run 
(and accounting for long-term labor market benefits of schooling) it is not his or her optimal 
educational investment strategy. 
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continue schooling is an intertemporal decision depending on students’ degrees of 
patience (e.g., Card, 1995; Frederick et al., 2002): Reconsidering the schooling 
investment decision, less patient students (as opposed to patient students) are closer 
to the margin of dropping out, because less patient students face a lower present 
value of schooling benefits that less likely outweighs current and near future costs of 
schooling. Holding the degree of patience constant and assuming that information 
updates are not conditional on patience, we test the following hypothesis: Patient 
students—as opposed to relatively less patient students—have a lower probability of 
dropping out of an educational program. 
1.3  The data, key variables, and sample characteristics 
To understand the role of time preferences in explaining dropout behavior, 
we collected a well-suited data set that comprises three key features: (1) two-years 
observation on our outcome variable, i.e., whether a student dropped out or stayed in 
school, (2) information on our main independent variable, i.e., students’ time 
preferences, and (3) student characteristics, including their socio-economic 
background, important ability measures, and information on the students’ social 
environments.4 We collected this data set in collaboration with the vocational schools 
and the cantonal (state) office, the “Mittelschul- und Berufsbildungsamt” (MBA) in 
Zurich.5 
1.3.1  The sample: Swiss students in upper secondary vocational education 
Our basis data set consists of 265 upper secondary students from 14 
complete classes in three public, tuition-free vocational schools in Switzerland.6 
Students in our sample are part of a vocational education and training program, 
meaning that they study part-time at vocational schools and work part-time at host 
                                                
4 We combine laboratory and field data from the same individuals. This combination is to our 
advantage, because preference parameters reflect the preferences of the student population about 
which we want to draw an inference. 
5 The same data set is used in Backes-Gellner and Oswald (2012). 
6 These schools are located in the greater region of Zurich, the largest Swiss city, located in the 
German-speaking part of Switzerland. 
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companies. As in Switzerland 70% of the graduates of lower-secondary education 
enroll in vocational education (SCCRE, 2011), our student sample represents the 
largest part of young adults pursuing an upper secondary educational program. 
Sixty percent of the students in our sample participate in training programs 
in the commercial sector (planning to become commercial employees) and 40% in 
the technical sector (planning to become either electricians or polytechnicians).7 The 
training program for students in the commercial sector lasts three years and includes 
training in a broad range of skills for carrying out administrative work in various 
industries. In contrast, the training programs for students in the industry sector last 
four years and include training in industrial skills. While electricians learn specific 
skills for setting up, installing, and maintaining complex electrical wiring systems, 
polytechnicians learn how to fabricate special tools and work pieces required in the 
production sector, to program and operate machines, and to monitor different types 
of production.  
1.3.2  The key variables 
   A. Experimental measures of time preferences 
We elicited time preference parameters using decision-making experiments 
that build on standard experiments used for example by Burks et al. (2009), Dohmen 
et al. (2010), and Meier and Sprenger (2010). The experiments were implemented in 
students’ classrooms right at the beginning of the vocational education and training 
program.8 We elicited two time preference parameters: For the first parameter, 
students chose between payments provided in either 3 or 6 months for each of 20 
payoff alternatives. The point at which a student switched from the delayed payment 
(always 100 CHF) (about 107 USD)9 to the earlier payment (ranging from 5 to 100 
CHF) indicates a student’s degree of patience. The higher the value of the switch 
point, the more patient a student is. We use this continuous measure for our main 
                                                
7 These three training programs are among the top 10 of the 230 training programs offered in 
Switzerland (OPET, 2011). 
8 For information on the experimental instructions see Appendix A1. For the original tables and 
instructions see the section “Additional Material” (Section A: Survey 2009, “Studienteil 3”). 
9 In 2012, the payout of 1 CHF was equal to 1.07 USD. 
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analysis investigating whether students’ degrees of patience determine their 
probability of dropping out.  
The second time preference measure differs from the first only in the timing 
of the payments: Students chose between payments provided on the same day or in 3 
months. If the switch point of the “today vs. 3 months” setting is lower than the 
switch point of the “3 vs. 6 months” setting, students have time-inconsistent 
preferences. These time-inconsistent preferences are also referred to as “hyperbolic” 
preferences (for an overview of papers on time-inconsistent preferences, see Rabin, 
1998 and O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999) and refer to individuals who are less patient 
in situations involving the near present (or the immediate present) than in situations 
solely involving future events. We control for students with hyperbolic (time-
inconsistent) preferences in one of our specifications in the empirical analysis.  
Relative to the purpose of our study, our time preference elicitation 
approach has one distinct advantage. Because we elicit students’ preferences right at 
the beginning of their educational program, individual preference parameters are up-
to-date without being determined by the educational environment (e.g., influenced by 
experiences gained while either working for the host company or attending the 
vocational school) in which we analyze dropout behavior. This advantage, however, 
does not accrue without compromise. Adopting this elicitation approach, the major 
concession we make is that preference parameters are only abstracted preferences 
that may be influenced by the framing of the experiment (for related literature, see 
Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992). For example the degree of patience might be 
underestimated, as experimental results suggest that the degree of patience is higher 
for larger monetary amounts. Our empirical results will show whether these 
abstracted laboratory preference measures are able to predict real-world dropout 
behavior. 
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B. Real-world dropout behavior  
We label students “dropouts” if they are not continuing the vocational 
education and training program that they began in 2009 and we label students 
“stayers” if they are continuing the program. The outcome variable thus refers to 
young adults who reversed their schooling decision they have had taken before the 
start of the educational program (to end up in a situation that might be more or less 
desirable).  
To collect information on our outcome variable (after having collected the 
baseline variables in August 2009), we follow each student for two consecutive 
years: In collaboration with the three vocational schools, we conducted follow-up 
surveys in the years 2010 and 2011 and contacted the students who were not 
contactable via schools individually by mail (and later reminded them by phone 
calls). For non-respondents, we complement our data with information from a 
cantonal (state) office, the “Mittelschul- und Berufsbildungsamt” (MBA) in Zurich. 
If a student was still living in the greater region of Zurich, the MBA was able to 
provide relevant information about whether a student dropped out of the training 
program and, if so, whether the student restarted an upper secondary education. 
1.3.3  Descriptive statistics 
For the descriptive statistics and empirical investigation, we analyze 240 
students. Following the students for two consecutive years, we face two types of 
limitations that reduce our sample size by 25 students (from 265 to 240): First, we 
exclude the six students for whom we have no follow-up information as to whether 
they continued the training program. Second, we drop the 19 students who did not 
report complete and valid information on our baseline variables of interest (for the 
list of baseline variables, see table 1.1).10  
  
                                                
10 One might expect that students who continue the training program are less likely to be one of the 19 
students excluded from the sample. We estimate a probit model to test whether the probability of 
being excluded from the sample is determined by the dropout status. We find no significant 
relationship. 
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A. Sample composition 
Table 1.1 presents descriptive statistics and differences in means between 
stayers and dropouts. The variables presented in the table are the control variables 
used in our multivariate analysis.11 While columns 1 and 2 in Table 1.1 list the means 
and standard deviations for the entire sample, columns 3 and 4 report the same for 
the sample of dropouts. We would like to emphasize that we collected all of the 
control variables, including the time preference measure, as part of our base survey 
in 2009 when students started the vocational education and training program. 
For the dropouts, we find that 20 students (9%) dropped out of the 
vocational education and training program between August 2009 and August 2011. 
While nine students (4%) completely dropped out, the other eleven (5%) dropped out 
but later restarted an upper secondary education. These numbers are consistent with 
data on apprenticeship contract terminations, i.e., dropout rates, in the vocational 
education and training program in the canton (state) of Zurich.12 Our full sample of 
dropouts can be characterized as follows: First, they are early dropouts, 60% of the 
students dropped out during their first year. Second, they are almost evenly 
distributed between the two sectors (9 industry sector students and 11 commercial 
sector students).  
 For the degree of patience, descriptive statistics show that students started 
their vocational education and training with a fairly heterogeneous level of time 
preferences (see subgroup E, table 1.1): The degree of patience, representing the 
point at which students switched from the higher (6-months-delayed) to the lower (3-
months-delayed) payoff alternative, varies from the lowest to the highest possible 
option with a mean of 75 CHF and a standard deviation of 20 CHF. 
For the composition of our sample, we discuss the control variables using 
five subgroups (see subgroups A to E, table 1.1). The first subgroup includes 
personal characteristics (i.e., gender dummy, native speaker dummy, and age): 
                                                
11 Our data set includes a wide range of additional variables. We carefully chose these variables both 
from existing literature and for their power to explain dropout behavior. 
12 The cantonal office “MBA” reports an overall contract termination rate of 9% of students attending 
a vocational education and training program in 2008 (Bildungsdirektion Kanton Zürich: MBA, 2009). 
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Thirty-seven percent of students in our sample are female. Eighty-three percent of 
the students are native German speakers. Students started their vocational education 
and training program at the average age of 16.  
The second subgroup represents ability proxies (i.e., math grades at the end 
of lower-secondary education13, a dummy for whether or not students entered into 
upper secondary education with delay14, and a dummy for whether or not mothers 
have a higher education degree15): More than one fifth of the students (22%) 
completed a voluntary tenth school year, thereby delaying entrance into upper 
secondary education (and later the labor market). A rather small group of students 
(17%) have mothers with a higher education. 
The third subgroup covers the students’ social environment (i.e., a dummy 
for students’ affiliation with deviant peers and a dummy for whether or not a student 
has parents who are divorced): Almost every third student (30%) reports to be 
affiliated with deviant peers, i.e., with people (or at least one person) who either are 
unemployed or work as unskilled workers. More than one fifth of the students (22%) 
have parents who are divorced. The fourth subgroup constitutes the occupations in 
which the students are undertaking the training (as described in subsection 1.3.1).  
  
                                                
13 Students report average math grades received prior to the vocational education, i.e., at the end of 
lower-secondary education in 2009, on a range from 1 to 6 (with 4 to 6 as passing grades). 
14 Graduates of compulsory lower-secondary education may delay entrance into upper secondary 
education by enrolling in a voluntary tenth school year. This additional school year does not lead to an 
additional educational degree and is provided for two purposes in particular: It either offsets what has 
been missed in compulsory education or supports the decision-making process of young adults who 
are undecided about the form of upper secondary education they want to attend. 
15 “Mothers with a higher education degree” here means mothers who have at least either a post-
vocational education or a university degree. 
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Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics and differences in means. 
Mean Std. Dev.
(1) (2)
Female 0.367 [0.482]
(1/0)
Native speaker 0.829 [0.377]
(1/0)
Age 16.358 [0.912]
(at entrance in voc. educ.; 2009)
Math grade average 4.833 [0.632]
(1 lowest, 6 highest)
Delayed entrance in voc.educ. 0.221 [0.415]
(1/0)
Mother: Higher education 0.171 [0.377]
(1/0)
Deviant peers 0.296 [0.457]
(1/0)
Divorced parents 0.221 [0.415]
(1/0)
Commercial 0.592 [0.492]
(1/0)
Electrician 0.204 [0.403]
(1/0)
Polytechnician 0.204 [0.404]
(1/0)
Degree of patience 75.125 [19.91]
(0 - 100)
Hyperbolic 0.463 [0.499]
(1/0)
Degree of risk preference 4.925 [1.682]
(0 - 9)
All Students
Means and Standard Deviations
A. Personal characteristics
Notes: (i) The statistic is based on 240 observations, with 220 being "stayers" and 20 being
"dropouts." (ii) "Means and Standard Deviations" columns report averages and standard
deviations in square brackets. (iii) "Differences in Means" columns report differences in means
(from two sample t-tests) and standard errors in square brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.10 indicate significance levels of the differences in means. (iv) Listed variables are collected 
at the very beginning of the upper-secondary educational program in 2009.  
B. Ability measurements
C. Social Environment
D. Occupations
E. Economic Preferences
Mean Std. Dev. Diff. Std. Err.
(3) (4) (5) (6)
0.250 [0.444] 0.127 [0.113]
0.800 [0.410] 0.032 [0.088]
16.350 [0.875] 0.009 [0.214]
4.613 [0.564] 0.241 [0.147]
0.400 [0.502] -0.195 ** [0.096]
0.200 [0.410] -0.032 [0.088]
0.450 [0.510] -0.168 [0.106]
0.300 [0.470] -0.086 [0.097]
0.550 [0.510] 0.045 [0.115]
0.350 [0.489] -0.159 * [0.094]
0.100 [0.308] 0.114 [0.094]
67.250 [24.68] 8.591 * [4.626]
0.400 [0.502] 0.068 [0.117]
4.750 [2.149] 0.191 [0.493]
Dropouts Stayers vs. Dropouts
Differences in Means
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The fifth subgroup accounts for further economic preferences (i.e., 
hyperbolic preferences and the degree of risk preferences) besides the previously 
described degree of patience. Descriptive statistics show that almost half of the 
students in our sample (46%) are hyperbolic discounters.16 These students come from 
both ends of the distribution of the degree of patience, meaning that some of them 
have a higher and other a lower degree of patience. For students’ degrees of risk 
preferences17, descriptive statistics indicate that the average switch point is where the 
expected value of the lottery option turns to be lower than the value of the safe 
option. 
 
B. Differences in means between stayers and dropouts 
We expect dropouts to differ from stayers in the characteristics described. 
Columns 5 and 6 in Table 1.1 show the differences in means and their standard 
errors. To evaluate differences in means between stayers and dropouts, we use t-tests. 
Because we calculate differences in means as the mean score for stayers minus the 
mean score for dropouts, a positive difference implies higher values for stayers. In 
general, Table 1.1 shows that students who leave the educational program before 
graduation have mean characteristics different from the sample of stayers. Primarily, 
we find significant (or at least marginally significant) differences among the ability 
measurements. The sample of stayers has on average higher math grades (p=0.103) 
and is less likely to have had entered into upper secondary education with delay 
(p=0.044). In addition, stayers are also less likely to be affiliated with deviant peers 
(p=0.116).  
  
                                                
16 This percentage corresponds to the quota found by Bettinger and Slonim (2007), where 43% of the 
children have time preferences consistent with hyperbolic discounting. 
17 For information on the adopted approach to elicit risk preferences, see Appendix A2. 
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Most interestingly, regarding time preferences, descriptive statistics show 
that the average degree of patience is 76 CHF for stayers and 67 CHF for dropouts, 
respectively. This difference in means is significant (p=0.065), indicating that 
dropouts are on average less patient than stayers.18 Figure 1.1 provides a preview of 
our results by plotting the distribution of the degrees of patience for stayers (dashed 
line) and dropouts (solid line). The figure offers visual evidence for different degrees 
of patience between students who continue the educational program and students 
who dropped out. For the dropouts, we observe a shift of the cumulative distribution 
function to the left indicating that dropouts are less patient than stayers.19 To further 
investigate whether dropouts and stayers differ in their degrees of patience, we 
conduct a probit regression analysis. 
 
  
 
 
Figure 1.1 CDFs of the degrees of patience. 
Notes: The panel plots the cumulative distribution functions of the degrees of patience for both stayers 
and dropouts. The degree of patience is measured by the switching points from the choices between 
payoff alternatives in either three or six months. 
  
                                                
18 Relaxing the normality assumption, we conduct a nonparametric Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-
Whitney) test on this difference. The result suggests a marginally statistically significant difference 
(p=0.107) between the underlying distribution of the degree of patience by stayers and dropouts. An 
increased degree of patience thus shifts the distribution toward stayers. 
19 A formal test of the equality of distribution (i.e., the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test), 
however, reveals that the difference between the two distributions is not statistically significant 
(p=0.298).  
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1.4  Empirical strategy 
We estimate a probit model with the dependent binary variable, dropout, 
which equals one if a student dropped out of the vocational education and training 
program initially started in 2009 and zero if a student continued the training program. 
The key independent variable is the degree of patience. To reduce unobserved 
heterogeneity, we include a set of control variables X in the model. We use the 
following equation to estimate the probability of dropping out for student (i): 
 
Prob dropouti =1 xi( ) =! !0 +!1 degree of patiencei + !k X ikk=2
n
!( ) ,     (1.1) 
 
with !  being the normal cumulative distribution function.  
We use five model specifications, in which we gradually include different 
subgroups of control variables. The inclusion of these subgroups is mainly motivated 
by existing empirical evidence on dropouts (see, e.g., Stinebrickner and 
Stinebrickner, 2008; Eckstein und Wolpin, 1999; Maani and Kalb, 2007). The first 
specification includes just occupation controls. The second specification adds 
personal characteristics (gender dummy, native speaker dummy, and age). The third 
specification additionally covers ability measurements (math grades achieved in 
lower-secondary education, a dummy for whether or not a student entered into upper 
secondary education with delay, and a dummy for whether or not a mother holds a 
higher education degree). The fourth specification accounts for students’ social 
environments (including two dummies: affiliation with deviant peers and divorced 
parents). Finally, the fifth specification covers further economic preferences 
(hyperbolic dummy, degree of risk preference). 
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1.5  Results and Discussion 
1.5.1  Results 
   A. Main finding 
Table 1.2 shows the coefficients of our probit regressions on the 
determinants of the probability of dropping out. Our results suggest that a student’s 
degree of patience is an important factor to be considered in the analysis of dropout 
behavior (row 1, table 1.2). The results show that the more patient a student, the 
lower his or her probability of dropping out of the vocational education and training 
program. This result is consistent with the descriptive statistics and confirms our 
hypothesis. After enrollment, students reconsider their educational investment 
strategy incorporating information updates. Now that at least part of the schooling 
costs are real, less patient students face a higher probability of dropping out, because 
highly discounted future schooling returns are less likely to offset their (updated) 
schooling costs.  
 
B. Robustness of our finding  
In the following, we examine whether the degree of patience is a robust 
predictor of dropout behavior. We find that the coefficient on the degree of patience 
remains significant and its sign stable when we gradually include the subgroups of 
control variables in specifications two to five (table 1.2). Adding further controls 
reduces unobserved heterogeneity and increases the pseudo R2 from 0.043 
(specification 1) to 0.151 (specification 5).  
The signs of the coefficients on the controls are as expected (with the 
exception of the coefficient on mother’s education) and consistent with the findings 
of existing upper secondary dropout studies (among others, see Petrongolo and San 
Segundo, 2002; Eckstein and Wolpin, 1999; Rinne and Järvinen, 2011; Maani and 
Kalb, 2007). At least one coefficient per subgroup (except for the subgroup of further 
economic preferences) significantly determines the probability of dropping out.  
With regard to the robustness of our results, the inclusion of two types of 
subgroups is of particular interest: first, “ability measurements” and second, “further 
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economic preferences.” Given that recent literature suggests a positive relation of 
cognitive ability and the degree of patience and a negative relation of the degree of 
risk aversion and the degree of patience (e.g., Burks et al., 2009; Dohmen et al., 
2010), one might expect that, with the inclusion of both ability and risk preference 
controls, the coefficient on the degree of patience would lose its significance. The 
stable coefficient on the degree of patience indicates that patience, at least in our 
analysis, captures, if at all, only part of the variation in ability and risk preferences 
and is thus an important factor to be considered in the analysis of dropout behavior.20 
Finally, the coefficient on the degree of patience is also robust to the 
exclusion of students who might not have understood the instructions for the 
experimental task. In the experiment, the final payoff alternative involved the choice 
between 100 CHF in three months (today) over 100 CHF in six months (in three 
months), respectively. Although the earlier alternative had the same value as the 
delayed alternative, 8 of the 240 students chose the delayed alternative. As those 
students might not have fully understood the task of the experiment, but currently are 
included as highly patient students in our sample, we test the robustness of our 
results by excluding those students from our analysis. We find that the results remain 
stable. The significance of the coefficient on the degree of patience even marginally 
increases. Results are available from the authors upon request. 
  
                                                
20 Our result matches empirical evidence found by Bettinger and Slonim (2007): Examining inter-
temporal choices of 5- to 16-year old children, they find that private schooling and test scores do not 
significantly correlate with patience. Similarly for risk preferences, Booth and Katic (2012) find that 
cognitive ability (measured by the Australian percentile ranking) is not related to the risk preferences 
of young adults aged 20. Same as in our study, these scholars do not use IQ measures to proxy 
cognitive ability (in contrast to Burks et al., 2009; Dohmen et al., 2010). 
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Table 1.2: Probit estimates for the probability of dropping out. 
Degree of patience -0.009 * -0.010 * -0.010 * -0.013 ** -0.012 **
(0 - 100) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Personal characteristics
Female -0.449 -0.520 -0.588 * -0.592 *
(1/0) (0.330) (0.337) (0.349) (0.348)
Native speaker 0.017 -0.140 -0.126 -0.173
(1/0) (0.317) (0.338) (0.343) (0.341)
Age 0.007 -0.171 -0.287 -0.272
(at entrance in voc. educ.; 2009) (0.136) (0.213) (0.197) (0.194)
Ability measurements
Math grade average -0.377 * -0.310 -0.315
(1 lowest, 6 highest) (0.194) (0.198) (0.197)
Delayed entrance in voc.educ. 0.730 ** 0.795 ** 0.815 **
(1/0) (0.350) (0.338) (0.336)
Mother: Higher education 0.079 0.067 0.067
(1/0) (0.317) (0.324) (0.322)
Social Environment
Deviant peers 0.476 * 0.474 *
(1/0) (0.249) (0.245)
Divorced parents 0.302 0.313
(1/0) (0.283) (0.285)
Further Economic Preferences
Hyperbolic discounter -0.180
(1/0) (0.247)
Degree of risk preference -0.048
(0 - 9) (0.068)
Log pseudolikelihood
(5)(4)(3)(2)(1)
-65.86 -64.86 -60.74 -58.85 -58.43
Pseudo R-squared
Number of observations
Notes: (i) The table reports binary probit estimates for the probability of dropping out of upper-
secondary vocational education. (ii) The key independent variable is the student's degree of patience
representing the point at which students switch from a "6-months-delayed" payoff to a lower but only
"3-months-delayed" payoff. (iii) Further control variables refer to students' personal characteristics,
ability proxies, social environments, and further economic preferences. These control variables are
conducted at the very beginning of the upper-secondary educational program in 2009. (iv) Robust
standard errors are reported in brackets. (v) All specifications include occupation controls. (vi) ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10 indicate significance levels.
0.043
240 240
0.058 0.118 0.145 0.151
240240 240
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1.5.2   Discussion 
Finding a significant and robust relation between the degree of patience and 
the probability of dropping out does not immediately reveal whether patience 
increases schooling or schooling increases patience. Some might argue that the 
degree of patience is endogenous, e.g., determined by education. Our carefully 
chosen setting, however, allows us to argue that, for our fairly homogeneous sample 
of students21, heterogeneity in their degrees of patience may cause dropout behavior. 
As we measured time preferences at the very beginning of the educational program, 
over the two years period in which we analyze dropout behavior the educational 
environment should not determine our preference measure. Our results thus indicate 
that a higher degree of patience could cause a student’s dropout probability to be 
lower. Of course, as we are not able to control for educational selection, our 
conclusions may not be generalizable to young people who have never started such a 
training program. 
1.6  Conclusions and Implications 
Our study provides first empirical evidence on whether students’ degrees of 
patience, measured by economic experiments, determine students’ probabilities of 
dropping out of education. Analyzing a self-collected data set on students in upper 
secondary education, we find that patient students have a lower probability of 
dropping out than relatively less patient students. This finding is robust to the 
inclusion of covariates and confirms our hypothesis.  
After enrollment, while attending a particular educational program, students 
learn about real costs of schooling and consequently reconsider their educational 
investment decision (first taken before the start of the educational program). For less 
patient students who highly discount long-term benefits accruing from graduation, 
schooling benefits are less likely to offset current and near future schooling costs. 
Consequently, this group of students faces a higher probability of dropping out.  
                                                
21 Our sample consists only of graduates from lower-secondary education who had chosen exactly the 
same form of upper secondary education, i.e., a dual-track vocational education and training program. 
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The finding of this study contributes to two streams of literature: First, given 
that the degree of patience is one of the various facets of students’ noncognitive 
skills, our result adds to the evidence (on educational outcomes) that investigates the 
relationship between noncognitive skills and dropout behavior (e.g., Coneus et al., 
2010; Heckman et al., 2006). As with our results, these scholars find that increased 
noncognitive skills (in their case measured by items different from preferences) 
reduce the probability of dropping out. Second, by showing that abstracted 
experimental measures of time preferences robustly predict real-world schooling 
outcomes, the study contributes to the literature that successfully combines 
laboratory measures of preferences with field behavior (among others, see Castillo et 
al., 2011; Chabris et al., 2008). 
In this study, we use dropping out of vocational education as an example of 
an upper secondary school environment for students aged 16 and above. Reducing 
the number of upper secondary school dropouts is among the top educational targets 
in many OECD countries.22 Our findings clearly suggest that the degree of patience 
is an important determinant of the probability of dropping out—a determinant for 
which both researchers and policy makers have to account not only in the analysis of 
dropout behavior in education but also in the design and execution of policies that 
tackle the dropout problem.  
Policy makers may tackle the problem at different points in time: First, in 
upper secondary education, interventions may aim at either decreasing the schooling 
costs or increasing short-term schooling benefits per se (as a means of bridging the 
gap of otherwise remote schooling benefits).23 Second, in lower-secondary 
education, interventions may contribute to well-founded educational choices 
                                                
22 Reducing the number of dropouts among youths aged 18 to 24 is a major target in the strategic 
framework for cooperation in education and training in Europe (Official Journal of the European 
Union, 2011), where EU Member States decided to increase the percentage of school graduates to 
more than 90% by 2020. This target is comparable to that in Switzerland, which aims at increasing the 
upper secondary completion rate from 90% to 95%. 
23 Examples of recently evaluated educational interventions are the provision of coaching programs 
(decreasing schooling costs), see e.g., Bettinger and Baker (2011), or of financial incentives 
(increasing short-term schooling benefits), see e.g., Angrist and Lavy (2009); Backes-Gellner and 
Oswald (2012); Dearden et al. (2009). 
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decreasing the likelihood of information updates in upper secondary education.24 
Third, interventions could tackle the problem even earlier, during childhood, through 
strengthening students’ noncognitive skills (e.g., the ability to delay gratification, see 
Heckman et al., 2010).25 
On the one hand, thus many approaches to the issue of dropouts exist, 
making it hard, on the other hand, for policy makers to identify the most appropriate 
policy instrument. This is an area where future research should make further 
contributions and assist policy makers in understanding how students in general—
and less patient students in particular—respond to dropout interventions. Most 
helpful would be future research that carefully and simultaneously evaluates the 
efficacy of different intervention programs to ensure that their impacts (among less 
patient students) are comparable.  
Whatever the intervention strategy, we are aware that not even the best 
intervention will be capable of completely eradicating students from dropping out of 
education. This is not inherently bad since not all dropouts end up in unfavorable 
situations. Enrollment in a particular training program is voluntary and may be part 
of a student’s search process that leads to discovery of what he or she likes and does 
not like.  
The following chapter investigates whether heterogeneous preferences lead 
students to respond differently to an intervention program. The chapter uses financial 
incentives as an example of an intervention program aiming at the reduction of 
schooling costs. The financial incentives, however, are offered not for schooling 
persistence per se but for good school performance. We thus continue to broadly 
investigate students’ educational decisions under uncertainty about future costs and 
benefits of educational investments.  
 
                                                
24 A potential instrument is the offer of coaching programs that complement students’ noncognitive 
skills by guiding, reminding, and supporting students to start choosing an appropriate upper secondary 
educational program early enough (e.g., Colding, 2006). 
25 Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) argue among the same lines and conclude that policies that alter 
students’ noncognitive skills (e.g., preferences) might be successful in preventing students from 
dropping out. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A1: Time preference elicitation approach: Experimental Instructions 
In all of the experimental sessions, the experimenter carefully explained not 
only the various choice options but also how payments would be carried out. First, 
for choices that involved immediate payments (i.e., today’s payment), the 
experimenter warranted that students would receive payments immediately after the 
experimental session. Second, for choices that involved future payments, the 
experimenter promised that students would receive cash payments by certified mails 
in the respective time in the future. To guarantee this promise, the experimenter 
explained that students would receive an official letter guaranteeing payments in the 
future.  
 
Appendix A2: Risk preference elicitation approach  
We measured students’ degrees of risk preferences by using choices 
between a paid lottery and safe payments in a sequence of 10 binary choices. The 
lottery was the same for all choices: Students won either 10 CHF or nothing, 
depending on the coin toss. The safe payments increased in value for each choice 
from 1 to 10 CHF. We identify students’ degrees of risk preferences by the point at 
which students switch from the lottery (10 CHF with p=0.5) to the save option. The 
lower the value of the save option at the switch point, the more risk averse (or the 
less risk loving) the student is. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
 
LEARNING FOR A BONUS: HOW 
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES INTERACT 
WITH PREFERENCES26 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
The past decade has seen a major proliferation of school interventions to 
encourage students to improve their school achievement. As increased human capital 
accumulation contributes positively to the welfare of and the equality within 
societies, the underlying aim of these interventions is obvious. Not surprisingly, a 
growing empirical literature investigates the role of incentives in education in 
general (see, e.g., Gneezy et al., 2011 for an overview) and the role of financial 
incentives for student performance in particular (see, e.g., Fryer, 2012 for an 
                                                
26 Backes-Gellner and Oswald (2012) is a working paper version of this chapter. 
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overview). Quasi-experimental and experimental studies evaluate financial incentive 
programs designed to improve student performance. These studies typically find 
small average program effects, if any at all (for secondary and post-secondary 
education, see, among others, Angrist et al., 2009; Angrist and Lavy, 2009; Fryer, 
2011; Leuven et al., 2010). Nonetheless, their findings suggest that while such 
programs can have positive effects for certain groups of students, they can have no or 
even negative effects for other groups of students. Thus far, relatively little is known 
about the reasons for these heterogeneous behavioral responses to financial incentive 
programs in education.  
Whether students increase their school performance in response to a 
financial incentive program is clearly an intertemporal choice, in which the timing of 
costs and benefits (of an increased learning investment) are spread over time 
(Becker, 1962). Therefore, any analysis of how financial incentives in education 
affect this intertemporal choice should include measures of students’ economic 
preferences (e.g., Frederick et al., 2002; Keren and Roelofsma, 1995; Prelec and 
Loewenstein, 1991). Preferences vary considerably among students (Castillo et al., 
2011; Dave et al., 2010), and recent literature has pointed to non-cognitive abilities 
(including economic preferences) as being systematically related to school 
achievement (Cunha and Heckman, 2010; Duckworth and Seligman, 2005; Heckman 
et al., 2006). That incentive effects in education interact with economic 
preferences—meaning that differences in preferences might affect students’ 
responses to financial incentives in education—would thus not be surprising. 
This chapter analyzes the effect of the existence of financial incentive 
programs on student performance by considering interactions of the incentive effect 
with two important economic preferences: students’ time and risk preferences. We 
derive our hypotheses by applying standard human capital theory (Becker, 1962; 
Bishop, 2006). To empirically investigate the effect of the performance pay program 
(PPP) on student performance and to assess whether, and if so, how the program 
effect depends on economic preferences, we collected a unique and comprehensive 
dataset. It includes information on both student performance (measured by end-of-
semester grade point averages) and students’ economic preference parameters 
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(measured by economic experiments when students started their vocational education 
program). These data are available within a school environment where some of the 
students are part of school-independent PPPs and some are not. The allocation of 
these PPPs approximates randomization.  
The unique combination of data allows us to contribute in two major ways 
to the existing body of evidence on financial incentives in education: Most 
importantly, we examine the link between the effect of financial incentives and 
students’ economic preferences. We thus shed light on some of the fundamentals of 
students’ responses to financial incentives. Moreover, we analyze the program effect 
in a school environment, i.e., in vocational education, where it has not yet been 
analyzed.  
The chapter provides two main findings. First, results indicate that, on 
average, the existence of PPPs significantly increases the performance of students in 
upper secondary vocational education. This average effect is driven by the high 
responsiveness of students in technical occupations. Second and novel to the 
literature, the results show that program effects differ across students with 
heterogeneous preferences. For students’ time preferences our findings suggest that 
highly impatient students increase their performance far more when financial 
incentives are offered. For students’ risk preferences our results are less convincing, 
leading us to suspect that risk loving students respond less to the PPP than risk 
averse students.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents 
the hypotheses. Section 2.3 describes details of the PPP, provides information on the 
elicitation of economic preferences, and presents the descriptive statistics. Section 
2.4 provides the empirical strategy and Section 2.5 presents the results for both the 
pure program and the interaction effects. Section 2.6 concludes. 
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2.2  Theoretical background 
While attending school, students make decisions about the time and effort 
they devote to learning activities. According to standard human capital theory 
(Becker, 1962; Bishop, 2006) they do so by comparing the present discounted value 
of the benefits (i.e., expected advantageous labor market outcomes, such as higher 
future earnings or lower unemployment risk) to the present discounted value of the 
costs (i.e., direct and indirect costs of exerting learning effort).27 Ceteris paribus, the 
theory predicts that students raise their school performance when their marginal net 
benefit increases, i.e., when monetary incentives for better student performance are 
provided. This argument translates into the first hypothesis: The provision of 
financial incentives to students with good school performance increases their 
performance (everything else being constant).28  
Nonetheless, the relationship between financial incentives and student 
performance is not straightforward. Further applications or complements of theories 
on human capital investments have strengthened the argument that the decision to 
invest in human capital depends on individual economic preferences, i.e., on risk and 
time preferences in particular (for risk preferences, see Brunello, 2002; Levhari and 
Weiss, 1974; for time preferences, see Blinder and Weiss, 1976; Borghans and 
Golsteyn, 2006). Considering significant heterogeneity in preferences among 
individuals (e.g., Harrison et al., 2002; Rabin, 1998) and among students in particular 
(e.g., Dave et al., 2010) we expect that incentive effects in education interact with 
economic preferences. 
                                                
27 Like Manski and Wise (1983), we assume that students form their expectation about returns to 
schooling as a function of the average test scores achieved in school. Empirical studies have shown 
that not only the schooling degree but also student performance (e.g., grade point averages) positively 
affect long-term labor market outcomes (e.g., Jones and Jackson, 1990; Roth and Clarke, 1998). In 
German-speaking countries, where job applications always include academic records, school 
performance matters for labor market entrance in particular (see Schweri, 2004 for Switzerland).  
28 Nonetheless, other streams of economic (e.g., Frey, 1994) as well as the psychological literature 
(e.g., Deci, 1971; Deci et al., 1999) could well predict the opposite: Due to the crowding out of 
intrinsic motivation, the provision of financial incentives may reduce individual performance. It 
remains mostly an empirical question whether financial incentives have a positive or negative effect 
on student performance. Thus far studies on financial incentives in education have found no evidence 
for lower intrinsic motivation of incentivized students (e.g., Fryer, 2011; Kremer et al., 2009). We 
thus add to this empirical literature on incentives in education and provide evidence on some of the 
fundamentals of students’ responses to financial incentives in education. 
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Given heterogeneity in time preferences among students (as shown by, e.g., 
Bettinger and Slonim, 2007; Castillo et al., 2011), not only the expected size but also 
the timing of the return on investment is crucial for students’ decision-making 
process. Generally, benefits from higher student performance (for example, in the 
form of higher wages) are derived only in the long-run. Students who overly discount 
the future, i.e., impatient students, choose to invest too little time and effort in their 
own education when they highly discount time lagged investment benefits (Becker, 
1975).29 The provision of financial incentives reduces the waiting period for parts of 
the benefits, thereby boosting discounted marginal benefits from higher student 
performance. As this benefit increase holds particularly for highly impatient students, 
short-term incentives most likely encourage this group of students to greatly increase 
their school performance. In contrast, for patient students, perceived marginal 
benefits change slightly (if at all), as the size of the short-term incentive is very small 
relative to the size of discounted long-term labor market benefits. This argument 
translates into the second hypothesis: When students receive short-term rewards, 
highly impatient students increase their school performance more than relatively 
patient students. 
Just as investors in financial capital, investors in human capital are also 
concerned about the certainty and risk of the returns of an investment (Brunello, 
2002; Krebs, 2003; Levhari and Weiss, 1974). Risk averse students choose to invest 
less in education when the benefits thereof are uncertain. Long-term benefits of an 
educational investment have at least two sources of uncertainty (similar arguments 
are made by Levhari and Weiss, 1974). First, benefits are determined by exogenous 
factors (such as changes in demand and supply for labor, new developments in 
technology or structural changes). Second, information about future benefits is 
limited, because students do not know today whether and, if so, how much a 
prospective employer will value increased school performance. With the provision of 
financial incentives, students have the possibility of reaping part of the investment 
                                                
29 Among others, Harrison et al. (2002) provide empirical evidence for this purely theoretical 
statement finding that individuals with longer investments in education have substantially lower 
discount rates. 
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benefits with a relatively higher certainty: First, benefits arise more immediately and 
are thus not as much exposed to exogenous future shocks. Second, the relationship 
between increased student performance and the additional monetary benefit is clear 
and provided by the rules of the incentive program. The provision of comparatively 
certain rewards thus increases perceived marginal benefits especially for the group of 
risk averse students who value these certain benefits more than they value the 
uncertain benefits. Therefore, financial incentives should particularly encourage the 
group of risk averse students to improve their school performance. These arguments 
translate into the third hypothesis: When students receive short-term rewards, risk 
loving students increase their student performance less than risk averse students. 
2.3  Institutional background, data, and descriptive statistics 
To investigate the effects of financial incentives and their interaction with 
preferences on student performance, we collect data on students who are part-time 
students and at the same time part-time employees as part of their upper secondary 
vocational education (a “dual” education). In this educational environment we make 
use of school-independent PPPs, in which some students participate and others do 
not. The allocation to these PPPs approximates randomization. 
The students in our sample started their dual education program in late 
summer 2009, at an average age of 16 years. At this point, we collected both 
experimental and very detailed background survey data (such as date of birth, 
gender, parental schooling, language at home, and single grades achieved in their 
previous school, i.e., compulsory lower secondary education).30 In late summer 2010 
and 2011, we conducted follow-up surveys collecting data on first- and second-year 
(end-of-semester) grade point averages (GPAs), among others, and details on the 
PPPs. To investigate heterogeneous program effects by student preferences, we 
combine these field data with experimentally elicited data on student preferences. 
                                                
30 We collected this data for a joint project with Michael Kosfeld, Holger Herz, and Donata Bessey. In 
this project we investigate the rationality of students' educational decisions. The project is a work in 
progress. 
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In the following three subsections, we first outline the PPP (in dual 
vocational education) that we use in our study. Second, we describe the 
measurements of economic preferences, and third, we provide key student 
characteristics of the program and comparison groups. 
2.3.1  Performance pay programs under the Swiss dual education 
Students in our sample take part in dual education programs in the 
vocational education and training (VET) system in Switzerland.31 Students study 
part-time at school and at the same time work part-time as apprentices in a “host” 
company to train their practical skills. Some of these host companies have 
institutionalized a performance pay program (PPP), in which they pay students 
bonuses for good end-of-semester GPAs achieved in vocational schools.32 Students 
who work in a host company offering a PPP thus have the opportunity to earn 
bonuses for good GPAs, whereas students who work in host companies with no PPP 
do not earn bonuses for good GPAs. Therefore, the first group can be seen as a 
treatment group and the second group as a comparison group.  
The maximum achievable yearly bonus equals almost an average monthly 
apprentice wage, which is around 1,100 Swiss Francs (CHF) (about 1,177 USD)33, in 
the second year of vocational education.34 The exact amount that students receive 
depends on their individual GPAs. In most cases, bonuses are paid twice a year. 
Compared to the incentives in existing studies (e.g., Angrist et al., 2009; Fryer, 2011; 
Leuven et al., 2010), incentives in this case are paid over a longer period, i.e., 
throughout the three to four years that the students remain in the dual education 
program. As the design of the PPPs differs by company, our estimation results will 
                                                
31 Attending a VET program is the most popular way of gaining a basic education in Switzerland 
(OPET, 2011). Graduates from a VET program hold qualifications that are highly valued by 
employers in the Swiss labor market and generally enjoy a low risk of unemployment (OPET, 2010). 
32 Host companies have an interest in incentivizing students’ school performance as the school 
curriculum covers theoretical knowledge that is complementary to the practical work that students 
carry out at work. Host companies that belong to trade associations determine the school curriculum 
ensuring that it is up to date and matches the host companies’ latest requirements (OPET, 2011). 
33 In 2012, the payout of 1 CHF was equal to 1.07 USD. 
34 The apprentice wage is higher for students in commercial occupations (average category ranges 
from 1,200 to 1,300 CHF) than for students in technical occupations (average category ranges from 
900 to 1,000 CHF). 
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capture the incentive effect produced by the pure existence of PPPs in host 
companies, as opposed to the non-existence of PPPs. 
Regardless of whether students work for a host company with an established 
PPP, students attend the same schools, sit in the same classrooms, and attend the 
same classes. Attendance is mandatory for all classes, with no option for class 
substitution. Given the nature of this experimental setting, we are able to compare 
students’ academic performance (i.e., end-of-semester GPAs) for both the program 
and the comparison groups. To draw a causal comparison of student performance 
between the program and the comparison groups we make two key identifying 
assumptions: First, we assume that a student’s host company choice is not 
determined by the offer of PPPs. Second, we assume that which companies offer 
PPPs and which do not is very idiosyncratic, approximating randomization from a 
student perspective. The rest of this subsection discusses the origin of our identifying 
assumptions. We not only show that students’ host company choices are independent 
of the offer of PPPs but we also explain that school allocation is governmentally 
regimented. 
In Switzerland, the apprenticeship positions are specifically created for the 
vocational education and training program, and voluntarily offered by host 
companies, which thereby ensure a consistent supply of qualified workers. Host 
companies post their apprenticeship openings in regional newspapers, on their own 
websites, or on online job websites, just as they do for any other job opening. Those 
advertisements generally do not include information on whether the company offers 
a PPP.35 Students who wish to enter the apprenticeship market apply for these 
positions in their desired field, i.e., in the occupation they plan to study. Host 
companies offer the best-matching students an apprenticeship contract, which 
terminates with the completion of the training program. Once this contract is signed, 
host companies are required to register the contract at the cantonal (state) 
                                                
35 We checked whether companies actively announce the offer of incentive wages in their ads by 
searching for apprenticeship job ads on the internet. The search, conducted by a research assistant who 
was not informed about the purpose of the search, was restricted to occupations analyzed in our study. 
Of over 100 ads, we found only one that included information on the offer of incentive wage for good 
school performance (in contrast to the one third of the students in our sample who end up in 
companies with PPP). 
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government office, which controls and approves apprenticeship contracts. Following 
strict governmental regulations, host companies enroll students in vocational schools. 
School allocation thus simply depends on the regional location of the host company, 
with no option for choosing a different school. 
In sum, we find no reason to worry that students—when they choose their 
host company—systematically self-select into companies with or without PPP. While 
we do not observe the selection process of the host companies, we have information 
on student characteristics for both program and comparison group students and are 
thus able to test whether these two groups differ from each other. Indeed, our data 
provides strong evidence that the characteristics of students who work in a host 
company offering a PPP do not differ from those of the comparison group students 
(see table 2.1). Therefore, also the empirical evidence supports the assumption that 
the allocation of PPP approximates randomization (more information is given in 
section 2.3.3). 
2.3.2  Experimental elicitation of economic preference parameters 
For the measurement of economic preference parameters, we use standard 
decision-making experiments, which we implemented in the classroom within a 
month of the starting date.36 Our experiments consist of two main parts: In one part 
we elicit students’ time preferences; in the other, we measure students’ risk 
preferences.37 The section “Additional Material” (Section A: Survey 2009, 
“Studienteil 3”) gives the original tables and instructions. 
In the first part of the experiment, we elicited students’ time preferences by 
means of two payoff tables. Each table contained a series of 20 payoff alternatives at 
different times. For each alternative, students made their choices, starting from the 
first row at the top of the table: While the delayed payments were always 100 CHF 
(about 107 USD), the earlier payments ranged from 5 to 100 CHF with increments of 
5 CHF moving down the table. For the first table, students chose between payments 
                                                
36 Participation bias appears unlikely, given compulsory schooling attendance. 
37 Notable examples of studies that use a similar approach (i.e., multiple price lists) to measure time 
preferences, risk preferences, or both are Burks et al. (2009); Dohmen et al. (2010); Harrison et al. 
(2002); and Meier and Sprenger (2010). 
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today and payments in 3 months. The second table differs from the first only in the 
timing of the payments: The students chose between payments in 3 months and 
payments in 6 months. We identify students’ degrees of time preference by the point 
at which students switch from the delayed payment of 100 CHF to the earlier option. 
The lower the value of the switch point, the less patient a student is.  
In the second part of the experiment, we measured students’ risk preferences 
by using choices between a paid lottery and safe payments in a sequence of 10 binary 
choices. The lottery was the same for all choices: Students won either 10 CHF (10.70 
USD) or nothing, depending on the coin toss. The safe payments increased in value 
for each choice from 1 to 10 CHF.38 We identify students’ degrees of risk preference 
by the point at which students switch from the lottery (10 CHF with p=0.5) to the 
save option. The lower the value of the save option at the switch point, the more risk 
averse the student is. As the expected value of the lottery is 5 CHF, only risk loving 
students should favor the lottery options when the safe options are greater than 5 
CHF. In contrast, risk averse students should always favor safe options smaller or 
equal to 5 CHF. 
Before the start of the experiments, we incentivized students to express their 
true individual preferences: The experimenter informed students that after the 
experiments, their notional chosen payments would turn into real payments if their 
tables were drawn in a lottery. For the experiment in which we elicited time 
preferences, we selected two students in each school class for payment at random. 
For those students who won the lottery, we randomly selected one row on the choice 
sheet as relevant for the payment. For the experiment in which we measured risk 
preferences, we randomly selected one row for payment for each student. 
Additionally, we fostered students’ trust in not only the immediate payments but also 
the future ones: The experimenter carefully explained the payment procedure: (a) for 
choices that involved immediate payments, students would receive payments 
immediately after the experimental session; (b) for choices that involved future 
                                                
38 The last row (where the values of both the lottery and the save options are 10 CHF) had no 
relevance for the measurement of risk aversion; we included it to test that students understood the 
task. 
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payments, students would receive an official letter (on university letterhead, with the 
student’s name, signed by the professor, and handed out immediately after the 
experimental session) guaranteeing future cash payments delivered by certified mail 
at the respective future time.  
According to recent evidence for temporal stability of preferences (see 
Meier and Sprenger, 2010 for time preferences; see Andersen et al., 2008 for risk 
preferences), we assume that student preferences remain static at least for the two-
years period of our analysis. 
2.3.3  Descriptive statistics and covariate balance 
Our baseline sample (collected in 2009) includes information on 265 
students from 14 complete school classes in three public vocational schools. Students 
in our sample are trained for three to four years in either commercial (i.e., business 
assistants) or technical occupations (i.e., electricians or polytechnicians).39 Students 
in technical occupations learn specific skills for technical production (e.g., how to set 
up complex electrical wiring systems or how to fabricate work pieces and tools 
required in the production industry), whereas students in commercial occupations 
learn a broad knowledge of skills for carrying out administrative work in various 
fields and industries. 
In 2010, 90% of the students in our baseline sample (245 of 265) completed 
the first follow-up survey. In this chapter, we discuss data only for students who 
reported complete information on both the first-year GPA variable and the control 
variables of interest. This adjusted sample, which we call the “first-year sample”, 
includes 200 students,40 one third (N = 65) of whom work for a host company with 
an established PPP. In 2011, 84% of the students in our first-year sample (167 of 
200) completed the second follow-up survey, reporting complete information on both 
the second-year GPA variable and the control variables of interest. Twenty-eight 
                                                
39 These three occupations are among the top 10 of the 230 occupations where training programs in 
Switzerland are offered (OPET, 2011). 
40 Students that did not understand the task of the economic experiments (14/265) are also excluded 
from the sample. 
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percent of the students in the second-year sample (N = 46) report receiving 
performance pay in both the first and second years of vocational education.  
One might expect that program group students are more likely to be part of 
the second-year sample. We deal with this concern at the bottom of Table 2.1: 
Statistics indicate that the selection of students in the second-year sample is 
independent of the treatment status. Additionally, we tested whether the participation 
in the second-year sample is determined by students’ economic preferences. We find 
no connection between a student’s second-year sample status and her or his 
economic preferences. 
Table 2.1 presents student characteristics sorted by four subgroups. The first 
subgroup covers personal characteristics: age, gender, and a native speaker dummy. 
The second subgroup covers ability measurements: a dummy for whether or not 
mothers hold a higher education degree, math grade at the end of lower secondary 
education, and a dummy for ever having repeated a grade.41 The third subgroup 
covers the company characteristic. “Number of employees” is the only variable 
available in our data for describing company characteristics. The variable is a 
dummy indicating whether or not a student is working for a host company with 100 
employees or more. The fourth subgroup covers students’ economic preference 
parameters. The dummy “risk loving” (as opposed to being risk averse or risk 
neutral) indicates whether a student is willing to take risk or not. Risk loving students 
still prefer the lottery options when the expected value of the lottery option is smaller 
than the value of the safe option. In contrast to the unequivocal identification of risk 
loving students, there is no such clear-cut way of defining the group of impatient (or 
patient) students. We create dummies of extreme characteristics of time preferences 
to increase statistical power when we include those dummies in our regression 
analysis. The “impatient” dummies refer to the 10th or 25th percentile of students who 
are always impatient, i.e., who are impatient either at the 10th or 25th percentile in 
                                                
41 Our data set includes further ability measurements; however, either these measurements do not help 
explain the variance in GPA, or their inclusion would further reduce our sample size. 
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both choice sets. Impatient students prefer a small amount of money today (in three 
months) than 100 CHF in three months (six months).42 
One way of testing our identifying assumptions is by comparing student 
characteristics of program and comparison groups. We thus report both means for the 
comparison group and differences in means for the program group for the variables 
within the four described subgroups (columns 1 and 2 in table 2.1). Differences in 
means are reported as coefficients. Those coefficients are the results of regressions of 
each of the students’ characteristics (e.g., age or gender) against the treatment status 
controlling for school and school classes.43 Displayed figures are in accordance with 
our identifying assumptions: Overall, the program and comparison groups appear 
balanced along observable dimensions. None of the reported differences in student 
characteristics—neither the variables themselves nor the variables as a subgroup—
are statistically significant. 
Program group differences for our first subgroup, personal characteristics, 
are not statistically significant. Descriptive statistics show that students entered the 
vocational program at an average age of 16, the traditional age for starting the 
program. A smaller fraction of students is female (40%), a percentage driven by the 
male-dominated technical occupations. A large proportion of students are native-
German speaking (83%). Within the second subgroup, program group differences for 
each of the ability measurement are positive but also not statistically significant, 
indicating comparable ability levels among the program and comparison groups. 
Likewise for the third subgroup, the company size dummy, the difference between 
the program and comparison groups is not statistically significant. The same is true 
for the fourth subgroup, i.e., the economic preference dummies. Descriptive statistics 
show that, on average, 36% of the students have risk preferences consistent with 
                                                
42 Whereas the 10th percentile of highly impatient students prefers 45 CHF or less today (in three 
months) over 100 CHF in three months (and six months, respectively); the 25th percentile of highly 
impatient students prefers 50 CHF or less today (and 60 CHF or less in three months) over 100 CHF 
in three months (and six months, respectively). 
43 As the apprenticeship for business assistants is very different from that for electricians and 
polytechnicians, we control for the different occupational groups by using the school the students 
attend as the identifying variable. Moreover, class controls are necessary for accounting for 
differences in class environments (e.g., teacher or peer differences), differences that may vary within 
one school/occupational environment. 
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being risk loving (as opposed to being risk neutral or risk averse). The fraction of 
risk loving students is rather high, given that individuals are generally found to be 
risk averse (e.g., Dohmen et al., 2010). In our experiment, however, offered stakes 
were relatively low in size, possibly causing students to make risky decisions with a 
higher probability (Harrison et al., 2005; Holt and Laury, 2002). For time 
preferences, only 16% (9%) of the students match our description of being highly 
impatient defined as the 25th (10th) percentile of students who are impatient in both 
choice sets.  
We further test the balance between the program and comparison groups by 
plotting students’ math grades in lower secondary education, i.e., before students had 
the opportunity to participate in a performance pay program. Panel 2.A in Fig. 2.1 
shows the distribution of math grades for the program group, along with the 
distribution of math grades for the comparison group. For comparison, we 
normalized grades so that they are distributed with a mean of 0 and standard 
deviation of 1. The plot indicates that the distribution of math grades before the start 
of the program is similar for both groups. As our descriptive statistics already 
indicate, before students begin the training program (before participation in PPP), the 
two groups appear balanced in terms of their ability level. 
Panel 2.B and 2.C in Fig. 2.1 provide a preview of our results by plotting 
the distributions of standardized first- and second-year GPAs. The GPA variables are 
the averages of the grades achieved in each class attended during a school semester.44 
In Panel 2.B, we plot the distribution of standardized first-year GPAs for the 
program group, along with the distribution of first-year GPAs for the comparison 
group. The plot offers first evidence for different student achievement between those 
two groups within the first year: For the program group we observe a clear shift of 
first-year GPAs to the right. The shift indicates that students in the program group 
have higher first-year GPAs than students in the comparison group.  
  
                                                
44 Students reported their exact first- and second-year GPAs on a range from 1 to 6, with 4 to 6 as 
passing grades. Because the purpose of the study (investigating the effects of PPP) was never shared 
with the students, the teachers, or the school principals, we can exclude with certainty the possibility 
that students in the PPP reported higher grades merely to exhibit the desirable behavior. 
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Table 2.1: Covariate balance. 
Comparison Group 
Mean
(1)
PPP Group 
Difference
(2)
Personal characteristics
Age 16.333 -0.049
(at entrance in voc. educ.; 2009) [0.961] (0.174)
Female 0.519 -0.033
[0.501] (0.070)
Native speaker 0.874 -0.072
[0.333] (0.070)
F-test for joint significance (F-value) 0.470
{0.705}
Ability measurements
Mother - higher education 0.163 0.023
[0.370] (0.074)
Math grade average -0.073 0.050
(2009, standardized) [1.047] (0.192)
Ever repeated grade 0.156 0.083
(2009) [0.363] (0.071)
F-test for joint significance (F-value) 0.500
{0.681}
Company characteristic
Number of employees 0.467 0.131
(dummy equals 1 if the number of employees >= 100) [0.500] (0.093)
Economic preference parameters
Risk-loving 0.326 0.127
(2009) [0.470] (0.094)
Impatient (25th percentile) 0.141 -0.001
(2009) [0.349] (0.068)
Impatient (10th percentile) 0.067 0.002
(2009) [0.250] (0.052)
F-test for joint significance (F-value) 0.620
{0.602}
Second-year sample
Being in the second-year sample 0.822 -0.023
[0.383] (0.071)
Notes: (i) The statistics are based on 200 student observations, with 135 being in the comparison
group and 65 in the PPP group. (ii) "Comparison group mean" column reports averages and standard
deviations in square brackets. (iii) "PPP Group Difference" column reports coefficients and robust
standard errors in parentheses. These coefficients are the results of regressions of each variable on the 
treatment dummy including school and class controls. Within these subgroups of variables we present 
F-tests for joint significance of all treatment differences. P-values for F-tests are in curly brackets.
(iv) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10 indicate significance levels.  
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In Panel 2.C, where we plot second-year GPAs, the shift of the program 
group’s GPA is strongest in the lower and middle part of the distribution. This shift 
suggests that, on average, program group students improve their GPA also in the 
second year of vocational education. By running multiple regressions, we test the 
robustness of this descriptive result. 
 
Panel 2.A—Math GPA                 Panel 2.B—First-year GPA            Panel 2.C—Second-year GPA 
(2009; before treatment)                      (2010; treatment year)                           (2011; treatment year) 
 
   
 
 
Figure 2.1 Regression-adjusted cumulative distribution functions of GPA residuals.  
Notes: Residuals are computed using a regression including school and class controls. While Panel 
2.A plots math GPAs achieved at the end of lower secondary education (before participation in PPP), 
Panels 2.B and 2.C plot average GPAs from the end of the first and second year of vocational 
education, respectively. 
2.4  Empirical strategy 
To empirically investigate whether students respond to the PPP and, if so, 
whether their response depends on their individual economic preferences, we 
estimate the following OLS model:  
 
GPAi = !0 +!1PPPi +!2ECONPREFi +!3 PPPi !ECONPREFi( )+!4Xi +ui .        (2.1) 
 
GPAi is the standardized, first-year (second-year) GPA for student i. The 
main explanatory variables in the model are dummies: PPPi is the performance pay 
program indicator with the coefficient !1, which captures the program effect. 
ECONPREFi indicates a student’s economic preference (i.e., degree of risk or time 
preference). (PPPi ! ECONPREFi) is the interaction term between those dummies 
with coefficient !3, which captures the interaction effect. Significant interaction 
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effects indicate heterogeneous program effects for students with different 
preferences. Xi comprises school and class controls as well as control variables 
covering the three subgroups (personal characteristics, ability measurements and 
company characteristic) as described and displayed in section 2.3 (table 2.1). We 
gradually include these subgroup controls to investigate the sensitivity of our results 
and to redress any potential imbalance between the program and comparison groups. 
Our control variables are similar to those used in comparable studies on student 
achievement (e.g., Angrist and Lavy, 2009; Bettinger, 2012). Finally, we include ui, 
an individual specific error term. For our estimations, we use robust standard errors. 
In the first section of the results, we run estimations to investigate the pure 
PPP effect, thus excluding the variable ECONPREFi and the interaction (PPPi * 
ECONPREFi) from model (2.1). In the second section of the results, to examine 
whether the program effect depends on student preferences, we run the full model. 
We examine interactions for each economic preference separately. 
2.5  Results 
2.5.1 The pure effects of the incentive program on first- and second-year GPA 
We start our analysis of program effects by looking at students’ GPAs in the 
second and fourth semesters, i.e., at the end of the first and second year of vocational 
education. As only part of the students in the first-year sample submitted the survey 
in the following year, the second-year sample is lower (by 16%). However, 
descriptive statistics (at the bottom of table 2.1) indicate that participation in the 
second-year sample is not related to participation in the PPP. We report four 
specifications. The first specification includes only schools and school classes. We 
augment this specification by gradually including control variables that refer to the 
same set of subgroups as described in Table 2.1—student characteristics 
(specification 2), ability measurements (specification 3), and company size 
(specification 4).  
In sum, we find a statistically significant and positive effect of the existence 
of PPPs on students’ first- and second-year GPAs. Carrying out separate analyses by 
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the two occupational subgroups, we find that program effects differ between students 
in technical and commercial occupations. For students in technical occupations, our 
results indicate a statistically significant and highly positive program effect on 
student performance. In contrast, for students in commercial occupations, the 
program effect is non-significant and almost zero. As the actual participation in a 
PPP is low for students in the commercial subgroup (14 of 116 students), we do not 
have enough power to draw a reliable conclusion from our results for the commercial 
subgroup. The rest of this subsection examines these results in more detail. 
Estimation results for the full first- (and second-) year sample (table 2.2; 
columns 1 to 4) indicate that students in the program and comparison groups differ in 
their school performance. Controlling for school and school classes only, we find 
that the treatment group’s GPA is on average 0.349 (0.386) standard deviations 
higher than the comparison group’s GPA (table 2.2, column 1). This difference is 
statistically significant (p<0.05). After we control for student characteristics and 
ability measurements, the program coefficient increases marginally in size. The 
significance of the coefficient remains robust across these specifications (table 2.2, 
columns 2 and 3). With the inclusion of the variable “company size” in column 4, the 
size of the coefficient decreases and its standard error increases. Nevertheless, the 
difference in student performance between the two groups remains significant 
(p<0.05 for the first-year sample; p<0.10 for the second-year sample). These results 
indicate that, on average, program group students have significantly higher GPAs 
than comparison group students. 
However, separate analyses by occupational subgroups show fundamental 
differences in program effects between students in technical occupations (table 2.2, 
columns 5 to 8) and students in commercial occupations (table 2.2, columns 9 to 12). 
Whereas we find a strong and significant program effect on student performance in 
technical occupations, the program effect on student performance in commercial 
occupations is non-significant and almost zero (in most cases, slightly negative). For 
students in commercial occupations we cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no 
program effect: Unfortunately, data are inconclusive in this case because only 14 of 
the 116 students participate in a PPP (in the first-year sample). Therefore, a larger 
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sample size would be needed to provide conclusive evidence on program effects for 
students in commercial occupations.  
PPPs are more prevalent in technical occupations (51 of 84 students 
participate in a PPP in the first-year sample) for which we find a largely positive and 
significant program effect: When we control only for school and school classes (table 
2.2, column 5), the estimated first-year (second-year) GPA is 0.642 (0.614) standard 
deviations higher for students in the program than for students in the comparison 
group (table 2.2, column 8). The size of the coefficient remains fairly robust across 
specifications with the largest decrease in specification four to an effect size of 0.545 
(0.529) standard deviations. The coefficient is statistically significant across 
specifications (p<0.01 for the first-year sample and p<0.05 for the second-year 
sample). 
The highly positive program effect on student performance in technical 
occupations is both interesting and surprising. The positive sign of the coefficient 
meets the expectations drawn from standard human capital theory. With the 
provision of additional benefits, the investment in human capital increases (holding 
other factors fixed). But, given the low responsiveness reported in the literature on 
student incentives, the question remains as to why students in technical occupations 
respond extremely strongly to the PPP.  
Assuming that the differences between technical and commercial 
occupations are real, we can think of three explanations.45 First, our data indicates 
that students in technical occupations place generally a higher value on pecuniary 
rewards (as compared to students in commercial occupations, the only available 
reference group). Students in technical occupations not only attach greater 
importance to their potential wage after graduation but also appear less satisfied with 
their current apprentice wage (in both the first and second year of vocational 
education). Therefore, students in technical occupations might place a high value on 
gaining the offered reward.  
                                                
45 Differences reported in this section are statistically significant (at least at p<0.10). 
 46 
Table 2.2: Program impact on standardized first- and second-year GPAs. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A: First-year GPA
Performance Pay Program 0.349** 0.376** 0.380** 0.356** 0.642*** 0.651*** 0.630*** 0.545*** -0.047 -0.013 0.035 -0.013
[0.155] [0.153] [0.147] [0.157] [0.178] [0.176] [0.182] [0.191] [0.249] [0.256] [0.223] [0.265]
School and class dummies x x x x x x x x x x x x
Student characteristics x x x x x x x x x
Ability measurements x x x x x x
Company characteristic x x x
R-squared 0.212 0.259 0.334 0.361 0.444 0.460 0.482 0.521 0.062 0.160 0.291 0.350
Number of observations
PPP participation
Panel B: Second-year GPA
Performance Pay Program 0.386** 0.407** 0.414** 0.358* 0.614** 0.625** 0.648*** 0.529** -0.029 -0.012 -0.045 -0.088
[0.184] [0.187] [0.187] [0.197] [0.237] [0.240] [0.242] [0.262] [0.276] [0.283] [0.238] [0.288]
School and class dummies x x x x x x x x x x x x
Student characteristics x x x x x x x x x
Ability measurements x x x x x x
Company characteristic x x x
R-squared 0.141 0.159 0.191 0.215 0.162 0.172 0.176 0.260 0.116 0.155 0.256 0.289
Number of observations
PPP participation 28% 50% 11%
72 95
Notes: (i) The table reports OLS estimates of the program effect on grade point averages (GPA) from the end of the first (2010) and second year (2011) of vocational education,
respectively. (ii) GPAs are standardized. (iii) Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. (iv) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10 indicate significance levels.
Full Sample Technical Occupations Commercial Occupations
33%
200 84
61% 12%
116
167
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Second, our data suggests that students in technical occupations (as opposed 
to commercial occupations) are significantly less interested in continuing their career 
in the occupation for which they are currently investing the training. As the human 
capital investment in the current occupation might not be directly linked with labor 
market benefits in a different occupation, students in technical occupations might 
place a low value on the long-term labor market benefits of better student 
performance but a relatively high value on the short-term reward offered by the PPP.  
Third, students in technical occupations have relatively high discount rates 
compared to students in commercial occupations: We find that students in technical 
occupations are significantly more likely to be highly impatient than those in 
commercial occupations. The following subsection will now analyze whether highly 
impatient students—students with a lower willingness or ability to postpone the 
acquisition of rewards—respond more strongly to the PPP.  
2.5.2 Heterogeneous program effects by time preferences 
In this section, we assess the significance of students’ time preferences by 
investigating whether the effect of the PPP on student performance interacts with 
students’ time preferences. In Table 2.3, we present estimates of equation (2.1), 
replacing ECONPREFi by time preference dummies that take the value 1 if a student 
is highly impatient and 0 otherwise. We report results for the two impatience 
dummies: While the first impatience dummy refers to students who are impatient at 
the 10th percentile in both choice sets, the second impatience dummy is broader, 
referring to students who are impatient at the 25th percentile in both choice sets (see 
descriptive section for more details). As for the results on the pure program effect, 
we again report regression results for the first- and second-year sample, using 
specifications identical to those reported in Table 2.2. 
We begin by describing results for the program and the interaction effect on 
the first-year GPA (table 2.3, panel A). Controlling for the 10th percentile impatience 
dummy, we find that relatively patient students (as opposed to students who are less 
patient) who work for a host company with a PPP increase their first-year GPA by 
about 0.244 standard deviations (table 2.3, column 1). This effect is marginally 
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significant (p=.122). The coefficient remains marginally significant for specifications 
2 and 3 (p=.111 and p=.102, respectively). If we instead include the 25th percentile 
impatience dummy, the program effect increases marginally in size in each of the 
specification (table 2.3, columns 5 to 8). Significance levels remain the same as for 
the 10th percentile impatience dummy. In sum, the program effect for relatively 
patient students is, if at all, only marginally significant.  
A look at the program effect for highly impatient students shows that the 
coefficient of greatest interest—the interaction term between being part of the PPP 
and being impatient—is positive, indicating that highly impatient students respond 
more strongly to the program than relatively patient students (table 2.3, panel A, row 
3). The coefficient is significant at the 1% level (table 2.3, columns 2 and 4), 
controlling for the 10th percentile impatience dummy and significant at the 10% level 
(table 2.3, columns 7 and 8), controlling for the 25th percentile impatience dummy. 
The effect size of the interaction is high and varies between 0.585 and 1.271 standard 
deviations (table 2.3, columns 1 to 8).  
For the second-year sample the performance pay effect increases in both 
size and significance for patient students, especially when controlling for the broader 
25th percentile impatience dummy (table 2.3, panel B, row 1). The interaction effect 
remains significant (although at lower significance levels than for the first year 
sample) for the 10th percentile impatience dummy but is no longer significant for the 
25th percentile impatience dummy (table 2.3, row 3).  
Overall, we find that highly impatient students increase their GPA more 
than patient students, especially in their first year of education. This result supports 
our hypothesis. First, short-term financial incentives boost perceived marginal 
benefits from increased student performance, especially for highly impatient students 
who greatly discount long-term benefits from increased learning effort. Second, the 
relative value of the financial incentives shrinks when real, relatively high labor 
market benefits approach. The second argument might explain why the difference in 
response to the incentive between highly impatient and relatively patient students is 
less pronounced in the second year. We cannot, however, rule out the possibility that 
other mechanisms (such as positive spillover effects) might also play a role. 
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Our findings thus suggest that incentive programs constitute an effective 
tool, particularly for increasing the performance of impatient students who are less 
willing (or less able) to postpone the acquisition of a reward. If impatient students are 
more likely to respond to financial incentives, offering short-term rewards at the very 
beginning of an educational program, when long-term benefits of increased student 
performance are discounted over a higher amount of years, would be most 
appropriate.  
 
Table 2.3: Heterogeneous program effect by time preferences. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: First-year GPA
Performance Pay Program 0.244+ 0.249+ 0.245+ 0.226 0.248+ 0.269+ 0.258+ 0.247
(dummy) [0.157] [0.156] [0.149] [0.162] [0.167] [0.165] [0.160] [0.175]
Impatient -0.169 -0.304 -0.416+ -0.427+ 0.066 0.023 -0.060 -0.065
(dummy) [0.315] [0.312] [0.264] [0.263] [0.244] [0.244] [0.229] [0.216]
PPP * Impatient 0.978** 1.163*** 1.271*** 1.202*** 0.585+ 0.608+ 0.709* 0.646*
(interaction) [0.399] [0.405] [0.360] [0.379] [0.365] [0.374] [0.360] [0.361]
School and class dummies x x x x x x x x
Student characteristics x x x x x x
Ability measurements x x x x
Company characteristic x x
R-squared 0.233 0.284 0.362 0.384 0.229 0.274 0.350 0.373
Number of observations
Panel B: Second-year GPA
Performance Pay Program 0.304+ 0.313+ 0.310+ 0.256 0.398** 0.420** 0.418** 0.363*
(dummy) [0.192] [0.194] [0.194] [0.209] [0.197] [0.201] [0.201] [0.212]
Impatient -0.224 -0.266 -0.287 -0.342 0.131 0.140 0.103 0.058
(dummy) [0.334] [0.327] [0.304] [0.324] [0.268] [0.275] [0.267] [0.263]
PPP * Impatient 0.722+ 0.813* 0.890** 0.865* -0.047 -0.063 -0.008 -0.013
(interaction) [0.452] [0.450] [0.440] [0.469] [0.426] [0.428] [0.438] [0.432]
School and class dummies x x x x x x x x
Student characteristics x x x x x x
Ability measurements x x x x
Company characteristic x x
R-squared 0.151 0.171 0.205 0.228 0.143 0.161 0.193 0.216
Number of observations
200 200
Notes: (i) The table reports OLS estimates of the program effect on grade point averages (GPA) from the end of first
(2010) and second year (2011) of vocational education, respectively. (ii) GPAs are standardized. (iii) The first (second)
impatient dummy refers to students who are impatient at the 10th (25th) percentile in both choice sets. (iv) Robust
standard errors are reported in brackets.  (v) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10, + p<0.15 indicate significance levels.
167 167
Impatient defined at the 10th percentiles Impatient defined at the 25th percentiles
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2.5.3  Heterogeneous program effects by risk preferences 
In this section, we explore the importance of students’ risk preferences by 
analyzing whether risk loving students (as opposed to risk averse and risk neutral 
students) respond differently to the PPP. Table 2.4 presents estimation results of 
equation (2.1), in which we include the risk loving dummy representing a student’s 
economic preference (ECONPREFi). Risk loving equals 1 if a student prefers the 
lottery option even though its expected value is lower than the certainty equivalent 
and 0 otherwise. The interaction effect of receiving performance pay and being risk 
loving provides a measure of whether the program effect depends on students’ risk 
preferences.  
For risk averse and risk neutral students, we find a significant average 
program effect on first-year (second-year) GPA of 0.524 (0.535) standard deviations 
when we control only for school and school classes (table 2.4, columns 1 and 5). 
This effect remains statistically significant and high in size for all specifications, 
indicating that risk averse and risk neutral students respond positively to financial 
incentives.  
The interaction term between being part of the PPP and being risk loving is 
negative for both the first- and second-year samples (among all specifications, see 
table 2.4, row 3). The negative interaction term suggests that risk loving students 
respond less well to the PPP than risk averse and risk neutral students. The size of the 
interaction term changes only marginally across the specifications from -0.394 
standard deviations for the first-year sample to -0.329 for the second-year sample 
(table 2.4, columns 4 and 8). However, the statistical significance of the interaction 
term is either nonexistent or very weak. Whereas we find slightly significant results 
for the first-year sample (.103<p<.142), the interaction term is not significant for the 
second-year sample.  
Although we do not find statistically significant interaction effects (with 
p<0.10), the high reduction in response to the incentive might indicate lower 
program effects among risk loving students. Overall, however, the results for risk 
preferences are not as conclusive as the results for time preferences. We can thus 
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only speculate about whether students’ differences in their degrees of risk 
preferences cause heterogeneous program effects. 
 
Table 2.4: Heterogeneous program effect by risk preferences. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Performance Pay Program 0.524*** 0.571*** 0.543*** 0.525*** 0.535** 0.569** 0.560** 0.498**
(dummy) [0.192] [0.186] [0.180] [0.193] [0.230] [0.227] [0.222] [0.235]
Risk-loving 0.026 0.113 0.117 0.127 0.052 0.099 0.073 0.050
(dummy) [0.180] [0.184] [0.177] [0.179] [0.207] [0.212] [0.210] [0.206]
PPP * Risk-loving -0.389 -0.453+ -0.381+ -0.394+ -0.349 -0.391 -0.351 -0.329
(interaction) [0.271] [0.277] [0.258] [0.262] [0.325] [0.332] [0.326] [0.338]
School and class dummies x x x x x x x x
Student characteristics x x x x x x
Ability measurements x x x x
Company characteristic x x
R-squared 0.222 0.269 0.341 0.368 0.147 0.166 0.197 0.220
Number of observations
Notes: (i) The table reports OLS estimates of the program effect on grade point averages (GPA) from the end of first
(2010) and second year (2011) of vocational education, respectively. (ii) GPAs are standardized. (iii) Risk-loving is a
dummy that equals 1 if a student prefers the lottery option although its expected value is lower than the certainty
equivalent and 0 otherwise. (iv) Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. (v) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10, +
p<0.15 indicate significance levels.
Dep. Var.: First-year GPA Dep. Var.: Second-year GPA
200 167
 
2.6  Conclusions 
The purpose of this study has been twofold. First, we aimed at learning 
more about the potential effects of performance pay programs offered in upper 
secondary vocational education. Second, we investigated systematic differences in 
program effects among students with different degrees of time and risk preferences. 
To conduct the research empirically, we introduced a unique dataset combining 
educational data, which includes real labor market incentive programs, with data 
from standard economic experiments. To test the robustness of our results and to 
redress any potential imbalance between program and comparison groups, we ran 
different model specifications. 
First, we find that the existence of the PPPs has on average a positive and 
significant effect on students’ first- and second-year GPAs. This positive program 
effect is driven by a statistically significant and high effect for the subgroup of 
students in technical occupations. Conversely, for the subgroup of students in 
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commercial occupations, the program effect is almost zero. As only a very small 
fraction of students in the latter subgroup is actually part of a PPP, our data does not 
allow us to reject the hypothesis that there is no program effect for students in 
commercial occupations.  
Second, we find that the responsiveness to the program depends on 
differences in student preferences. For time preferences, the results show that highly 
impatient students in particular respond strongly to the incentive program by 
increasing their GPA more than relatively patient students. For risk preferences, the 
results are less conclusive: We can only speculate that risk loving students might 
respond less well to the incentive than risk averse students.  
We are the first to systematically show that financial incentives in education 
particularly target highly impatient students. This finding gives us a hint of when 
providing financial incentives might be most effective. As graduation approaches, 
the perceived value of real labor market benefits increases and the perceived added 
value of financial incentives decreases. Therefore, we suggest that the provision of 
financial incentives might be most effective at the beginning of an educational 
program. 
Clearly, the presented evidence is based on a small sample of students and 
results might be specific to the underlying performance pay programs. Therefore, 
drawing a more general conclusion from our findings calls for further research in 
both the same and different educational environments. Identifying students who most 
likely respond to financial incentives will not only help target incentives to a tighter 
range of students but also provide them at the right time—both of which would 
increase the cost effectiveness of performance pay programs in education. 
Summing up the first two chapters, the findings provide strong evidence that 
differences in students’ degrees of patience shape the educational investment patterns 
of students in upper secondary education. Given the preference heterogeneity among 
individuals, the third chapter changes the focus to employers’ decision about the 
provision of training to their workers when workers’ individual preferences (for 
staying with the firm) are unobservable. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
 
NEW INSIGHTS ON THE PART-TIME 
TRAINING GAP: HOW DIFFERENT 
ARE WOMEN AND MEN?46 
 
 
 
3.1  Introduction 
Existing literature on training persistently finds that participation in training 
is generally lower for part-time than for full-time workers (for an overview see 
Blundell et al., 1996; for employer-provided training in particular, see Bassanini et 
al., 2007 or Hoque and Bacon, 2008). Studies show that the lower the number of 
working hours, the lower the probability of training participation (cf. e.g., 
Oosterbeek, 1998)—a finding consistent with standard human capital theory. The 
shorter return period discourages both employers and workers from investing in 
training. Although in almost any labor market outcome there are substantial 
                                                
46 Backes-Gellner et al. (2011) is a working paper version of this chapter.  
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differences between female and male workers, training-related studies have thus far 
focused on the part-time training gap in general and neglected whether this training 
gap is different for female and male part-time workers. 
Indeed, recent literature on earnings finds significant differences in earnings 
between women and men in part-time and full-time employment. Hirsch (2005), 
using U.S. panel data, and Mumford and Smith (2009), using British survey data, 
find the residual part-time/full-time earnings gap to be essentially zero for women 
but substantially negative for men. We therefore assume that part-timers are not a 
homogeneous group of workers and transfer the idea of gender differences in the 
part-time/full-time earnings gap to the analysis of gender differences in the part-
time/full-time training gap.47 Investigating this difference in detail is important given 
the highly unequal distribution of part-time participation between women and men. 
This chapter analyzes whether the part-time/full-time training gap, in short 
the “part-time training gap”, is different for female and male workers. We use a rich 
data set, the Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS), which allows us to focus on 
employer-provided training. This focus is important because employers not only 
provide by far the largest share of work-related training (Almeida-Santos and 
Mumford, 2005; Leuven and Oosterbeek, 1999; Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1999), 
but also play a pivotal role in shaping training patterns with their investment 
motives.48  
To analyze the part-time training gap separately for female and male 
workers, we draw on both human capital theory and statistical discrimination theory. 
The combination of these theories is innovative and allows us to account for the fact 
that employers take training decisions under uncertainty. We argue that a worker’s 
expected future working time volume with the current firm, in short a worker’s 
                                                
47 An interesting side result of a study focusing on labor market flexibility and its relation to work-
related training already indicates a difference between part-time women and part-time men in terms of 
training participation (Arulampalam and Booth, 1998). However, the authors have not further 
addressed this empirical pattern. 
48 Theoretically, we expect firms to provide little or no support in workers’ general training. 
Empirically, by contrast, we observe a wide engagement of firms in workers’ training participation, 
even if that engagement is general (e.g., Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1999 show that most employer-
provided training is general, not specific). 
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“future firm attachment”, is one of the most important characteristics affecting 
employers’ training decisions. Women and men in part-time and full-time 
employment can be expected to differ in their firm attachment and, as a result, in 
their access to employer-provided training. Drawing on standard human capital 
theory (Becker, 1964), a higher future firm attachment should be positively 
correlated with a higher training probability.  
As workers’ future firm attachment is obviously not observable, we also 
draw on statistical discrimination theory (Aigner and Cain, 1977; Altonji and Blank, 
1999; Phelps, 1972) to explain how this uncertainty might cause systematic 
differences in access to employer-provided training for different groups of workers. 
In line with the model of statistical discrimination theory, we suggest that part-time 
employment status is one potential indicator for future firm attachment, and we 
expect it to cause systematic differences in training participation by gender. We 
argue that while for male workers, part-time employment status is a predictive 
indicator for a lower future firm attachment; this is not the case for female workers, 
leading to an economically significant part-time training gap for male workers but 
not for female workers.  
The study contributes to our understanding of differences in labor market 
outcomes induced by part-time employment and gender. The findings emphasize that 
women and men working part-time, as opposed to full-time, are treated quite 
differently on the labor market. Our results show that being female and working part-
time has a significant positive joint effect on the probability of receiving employer-
provided training, counteracting the generally negative effect of part-time 
employment. The part-time training gap thus differs by gender: For women, working 
part-time instead of full-time constitutes only a minor difference; for men, however, 
working part-time constitutes a serious disadvantage in access to employer-provided 
training.49 
                                                
49 An across gender comparison, however, makes clear that women in full-time employment have a 
lower training probability than men. Both, the female training disadvantage in full-time employment 
and the gender difference in the training disadvantage in part-time employment are consistent with our 
adapted model of statistical discrimination theory where employers take training decisions under 
uncertainty about workers’ future firm attachment. 
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The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 provides the theoretical 
framework. Section 3.3 describes the data and presents the descriptive analyses. 
Section 3.4 provides and discusses the probit estimates and predicted probabilities 
for employer-provided training. Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2  Theoretical framework 
3.2.1  A model of the employer’s decision to provide training under uncertainty 
We analyze the employer’s decision to provide training as an investment 
decision. Human capital theory, as pioneered by Becker (1964), states that employers 
will invest in workers’ human capital only if the expected rate of return exceeds the 
costs of investment. The theory thereby predicts that the return period is one of the 
crucial factors for employers’ training decisions. In our model, we specify the 
expected return period in detail by introducing worker’s firm attachment. We define 
a worker’s future firm attachment as the expected future working time volume, i.e., 
the length of time a worker will stay with the current firm (expected tenure) times the 
worker’s future contracted number of weekly working hours. In line with standard 
human capital theory, we assume that the higher the expected firm attachment the 
higher the returns on training and thus the more likely employers invest in training 
(e.g., Becker, 1964; Lazear and Rosen, 1990). Future firm attachment is thus a highly 
training-related but obviously at the same time an unobservable characteristic. 
The underlying implicit assumption of standard human capital theory is that 
employers, when deciding on training investments, are fully informed about workers’ 
future firm attachment. However, this assumption on full information is critical 
because employers may have not only limited information as to a worker’s intention 
to remain with the current firm but also as to a worker’s future weekly working 
hours. Therefore, employers have to take their training decisions under uncertainty.  
To analyze such decisions in a situation of uncertainty about workers’ future 
firm attachment, we suggest adding theoretical considerations from statistical 
discrimination theory (Aigner and Cain, 1977; Phelps, 1972), which provides a 
framework for investigating decisions under uncertainty. Statistical discrimination 
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theory has been used for analyzing hiring decisions when employers have limited 
information about job applicants. The theory’s main idea is that employers use 
observable characteristics of applicants as indicators for workers’ unobservable 
characteristics, e.g., future productivity. Uncertainty about workers’ future 
productivity can work against groups with less reliable indicators, because in the case 
of less reliable indicators previous statistical experience related to workers’ group 
identity (e.g., gender) increases in importance.  
We extend the approach of Aigner and Cain (1977) by adapting their model 
to employers’ training decisions in which the important role of unobservable 
characteristics is similar to that in hiring decisions. While in the original model 
workers’ innate productivity is the unobservable characteristic (relevant for hiring 
decisions), in our adaption of the model the workers’ future firm attachment is the 
unobservable characteristic (relevant for training decisions). 
3.2.2  Statistical discrimination theory and employer-provided training  
Applying statistical discrimination theory to employers’ training decisions, 
we assume that employers base their training decisions on observable individual 
indicators for future firm attachment (e.g., part-time employment status). If, 
however, individual indicators are not reliable enough to predict future firm 
attachment, employers base their training decisions on previous statistical experience 
for a related group identity (e.g., gender). In our adaptation of the model presented in 
statistical discrimination theory, employers rely on the one hand on individual 
indicators i to make assumptions about a worker’s future firm attachment f. The 
relation between i and f is: 
i = f +u ,                       (3.1) 
where u is assumed to be a normally distributed error term, with zero mean and 
constant variance; f is also assumed to be normally distributed with a mean equal to 
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fˆ
!.50 On the other hand, employers rely on previous statistical experience utilizing a 
self-assessed group mean of future firm attachment ! to predict an individual 
worker’s future firm attachment.  
Taken together, given the indicator variable and the group mean, the 
expected value of future firm  attachment     is: 
fˆ = E f i( ) = 1!!( ) "! +" " i#$ %& .                (3.2) 
The factor " is the weight  of the individual effect i. It also determines the 
weight of the group effect, whereby the group effect is (1 - ") !. The less reliable the 
individual indicator (low "), the more the weight of the group effect increases. Thus 
when individual-specific information on workers is limited, employers cannot 
accurately predict future firm attachment for individual workers. Employers then turn 
to group identification as a predictor for future firm attachment.  
Suppose that gender, as the group identification, is observed along with 
potential individual indicators for firm attachment. Assuming that the reliability of 
the indicators (and thus the available information) differs for female (w) and male 
(m) workers, employers use different weights and different gender-specific 
measurement equations to predict workers’ future firm attachment: 
                (3.3) 
.                (3.4) 
We assume that employers, when deciding about training provision, look for 
indicators that accurately predict future firm attachment. Employment status, i.e., 
working part-time instead of full-time, is an indicator available on the labor market 
and is easily at an employer’s disposal.  
                                                
50 Following Aigner and Cain (1977), we assume that firms’ assessment of workers’ average future 
firm attachment is on average without bias, i.e., the realized average firm attachment equals the 
predicted average firm attachment. 
! 
ˆ f w = (1"#w )$ %w +#w $ iw[ ]
fˆm = (1!!m ) "!m +!m " im[ ]
 Chapter 3: New insights on the part-time training gap: How different are women and men? 
 
59 
3.2.3  Employment status as a potential indicator for future firm attachment  
We assume that employment status is an indicator whose reliability in 
predicting future firm attachment differs for female and male workers. In the 
following, we argue that the part-time indicator is more reliable for male workers 
than for female workers. Consequently, employers will weigh the part-time indicator 
more heavily for male than for female workers when predicting their future firm 
attachment, i.e., factor " is higher in eq. (3.4) predicting the future firm attachment 
for male workers than in eq. (3.3) for female workers: 
.                       (3.5) 
As a result, for male workers, employers’ weighting will put male part-
timers at a disadvantage compared to male full-timers (given male part-timers’ lower 
expected firm attachment). For female workers, in contrast, employers will put more 
weight on the group indicator, i.e., on previous statistical experience on female 
workers’ firm attachment, than for male workers. This weighting will induce that 
women’s probability of participating in training will not change when they work 
part-time instead of full-time. In general, however, women will face lower training 
probabilities merely by virtue of being female. 
An explanation for the gender-specific differences in the reliability of the 
individual indicator is the variation in the degree of heterogeneity within the female 
and male workforce. We now show why we can reasonably assume that part-time 
employment status serves as a reliable (negative) indicator of future firm attachment 
for male workers but is significantly less reliable for female workers—adding no 
meaningful information in a situation of uncertainty about future firm attachment.51  
The part-time indicator for female workers iw is unsuited to predict future 
firm attachment due to the large unobserved heterogeneity among the female 
workforce. This heterogeneity—ranging from women working full-time for their 
entire work lives to those working part-time for a period of time to those working 
full-time until they give birth to their first child and leaving the labor market 
                                                
51 In 1986, Cain has already noticed that, in general, female workers might have difficulty signaling 
their long-term labor market commitment. Neumark (1999) added empirical support by showing that 
poorer labor market information about female workers is partly responsible for wage differentials. 
!w < !m
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altogether—may stem from women’s still carrying the main responsibility for family 
work, from their being (traditionally) considered secondary wage earners, or both. 
Therefore, we argue that future firm attachment does not differ systematically 
between female part-timers and full-timers. Predicting future firm attachment based 
on current employment status (part-time or full-time) results in a large measurement 
error for female workers for two reasons: First, current employment status does not 
reliably predict how long a woman will remain with a firm. Second, the relationship 
between current and future employment status does not vary systematically by 
current employment status. Given the low reliability of part-time employment status 
as an individual indicator for women’s future firm attachment (low "w), our model 
suggests that employers give increased weight to the group mean !w—and thus to 
women’s average future firm attachment—to properly appraise their future firm 
attachment. Consequently, we derive our first hypothesis: Employers provide similar 
training opportunities to women in part-time and full-time employment (all else 
being equal).  
By contrast, we argue that for men the individual part-time indicator im 
reveals reliable information on men’s future firm attachment, because for men future 
firm attachment varies systematically between male part-timers and full-timers. Men 
are typically more likely to be employed part-time —as opposed to full-time—when 
they bear a higher responsibility outside the employment relationship or when they 
willingly spend large amounts of time on leisure activities, limiting their mobility 
and thus their labor market availability and flexibility (e.g., Hardoy and Schøne, 
2006). In addition, empirical evidence suggests that years of tenure are typically 
lower for male part-timers than for male full-timers (cf. e.g., O’Dorchai et al., 2007). 
The current employment status (part-time or full-time) is thus a reliable indicator to 
predict men’s future firm attachment for two reasons: First, the current part-time 
status indicates fewer years of expected tenure and thus a lower firm attachment. 
Second, male workers who are currently employed part-time are more likely to also 
be employed part-time in the future than those currently employed full-time. Given 
this higher reliability of part-time status as an individual negative indicator for men’s 
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future firm attachment (high "m), we derive our second hypothesis: Employers 
provide male full-timers more training than male part-timers (all else being equal).  
Because we predict the weight of the part-time indicator to vary 
substantially between women and men, we empirically expect a positive interaction 
term between female gender and part-time employment. A significant positive 
interaction term would indicate that part-time employment is not as disadvantageous 
for female workers as for male workers in employers’ training decisions. 
3.3  Data, descriptive analysis, and empirical model  
Analyzing the training probabilities of women and men in part-time and 
full-time employment requires data containing rich information on specific training 
facets, including information on whether training is work-related or employer-
provided. Moreover, the analysis requires information on the number of working 
hours. Ideally, workers should report a number of firm and job characteristics, 
together with details on a variety of features describing their personal situation and 
household structure. The Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS), a nationally 
representative data set of private households in Switzerland, is a perfect match to 
investigate this research question. 
The SLFS provides information on the structure of the labor force and 
employment behavior patterns. The data allows us to predict training probabilities, 
controlling for the usual variables in studies on training participation (e.g., Bassanini 
et al., 2007). As the SLFS adheres to international definitions, it makes Swiss data 
comparable with OECD data. The survey collects detailed information on training 
every three to four years, with the survey on training being enhanced since 2006. To 
investigate our hypotheses, we use data from the 2009 wave and test our results for 
consistency with data from the 2006 wave.  
We focus our estimation on individuals, aged 25 to 64, in part-time and full-
time employment, who reported valid information on all variables of interest. We 
restrict our sample to workers who work one day or more per week, as we assume 
that those working less are a very specific, unrepresentative group of workers not 
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receiving much training, if any. We further exclude self-employed individuals and 
workers in public administration and education, as their access to training is 
differently organized. The sample selection results in a data set with 17,120 
observations.  
3.3.1  Employer-provided training and the main explanatory variables 
The survey defines “training”, our dependent variable of interest, as a 
learning activity that does not end in an educational degree and is thus not part of the 
institutionalized educational system. Respondents report whether they participated in 
such a learning activity in the previous 12 months. Affirmative answers are followed 
by the question of whether they participated for private or work-related reasons. 
Further, we have information on whether training is employer-provided, defined as 
including training that employers (at least partly) finance, that (at least partly) occurs 
during working hours, or both. Focusing on employer-provided work-related 
training, the variable covers courses, seminars, congresses, lectures, conferences, and 
private lessons. Training takes the value 1 if a worker received any employer-
provided work-related training in the previous year and 0 otherwise.  
Female gender and part-time employment are our two main explanatory 
variables. We rely on the SLFS definition of part-time status, which is considered the 
common definition of part-time employment in Switzerland: less than 37 contracted 
hours (corresponding to a four-and-a-half-day working week or less). Although this 
definition differs from the more common definition of 30 working hours or less (e.g., 
Arulampalam and Booth, 1998), sensitivity analysis for the choice of cut-off points 
show that our results remain robust for either definition (results are available from 
the authors upon request). We therefore stay with the local official definition, which 
we assume to be the most reliable information that local employers also use. 
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3.3.2  Descriptive analysis 
Our sample includes 12,537 full-time and 4,583 part-time workers, i.e., 
every fourth employee in our sample works part-time. Whereas in our sample more 
than 50% of the female labor force works part-time, only 6% of male workers are 
part-time employed. Among OECD countries, on average 25% of the female and 
10% of the male labor force is part-time employed. Part-time employment is thus 
less prevalent and female and male part-time shares are closer. However, countries 
such as the United Kingdom have also substantially higher part-time shares, which 
are also dominated by female workers (OECD, 2010). In our sample, employers 
provide their workers almost 80% of the training, either by (partly) financing it, by 
(partly) providing working hours, or both. This share of employer-provided training 
is consistent with data analyzed in other training-related studies (e.g., Leuven and 
Oosterbeek, 1999). 
Table 3.1 presents the means and differences in means for employer-
provided training and selected individual characteristics broken down by gender and 
part-time/full-time status. Row 1 in Table 3.1 indicates that men in full-time 
employment participate the most in work-related training (42%), followed by women 
in full-time employment (39%). Female and male part-timers have equally low 
training participation rates of 33%, both with a considerable part-time training gap 
for men (9 percentage points) and women (6 percentage points). Both differences in 
means are highly statistically significant.  
To acquire a first insight into whether the gender-specific differences in the 
reliability of the part-time indicator are borne out in our data, we give more detailed 
descriptive background and analyze by gender whether part-timers and full-timers 
differ in other characteristics that determine training participation rates. Our data 
indicates that women are more likely to work part-time when married or raising 
children (table 3.1, rows 2 and 3). Women thus work part-time mainly for family 
reasons, whereas for men family reasons matter, but to a significantly lesser degree 
(i.e., 63% and 38% of part-time working women and men have children, 
respectively). Table 3.1 also shows for both, female and male part-time workers, that 
the older cohort (aged 41 to 64) is over-represented, suggesting that part-time work 
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might also be a bridge to retirement, more likely for male workers than for female. 
Given the underlying data, men’s reasons for working part-time are less obvious. 
Therefore, employers face a high uncertainty when predicting male part-timers’ 
future firm attachment.  
In the theory section, we suggest that the part-time indicator is reliable for 
men but not for women in predicting individual future firm attachment. One reason 
for this suggestion is that for men, working part-time versus full-time correlates with 
the length of the return period (i.e., expected tenure), whereas for women there is no 
such systematic relationship. Descriptive statistics confirm this suggestion: Female 
workers do not significantly differ in their average tenure, whether they are working 
part-time or full-time (table 3.1, row 7). Men, in contrast, stay with an employer 1.4 
years longer, on average, when working full-time. Moreover, when examining 
switches from part-time to full-time work status (or vice versa), we find women to 
switch their work status more than twice as often as men, measured relative to those 
continuing in either employment status. Taken together, these patterns suggest that 
working part-time correlates with a lower average future firm attachment for men but 
not for women. Since our raw figures clearly show a different relationship between 
part-time employment and future firm attachment based on gender (table 3.1, row 7), 
according to hypothesis 1 and 2 we expect an economically significant part-time 
training gap for men but not for women.  
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for men and women in full-time and part-time employment. 
(1) Training
Mean Std. Dev.
0.423 0.494
N = 8,819
Male workers
Full-time
Mean Std. Dev.
0.327 0.469
N = 603
Part-time Equality 
of means
t-test Mean Std. Dev.
4.87*** 0.395 0.489
Full-time
N = 3,718
Female workers
Mean Std. Dev.
0.326 0.469
Part-time
N = 3,980
Equality 
of means
t-test
6.28***
(2) Married 0.668 0.471 0.546 0.498 5.85*** 0.391 0.488 0.671 0.470 -25.56***
(3) Children 0.508 0.500 0.385 0.487 6.02*** 0.311 0.463 0.631 0.483 -29.63***
(4) Aged 25-40
(5) Aged 41-64
0.440 0.496
0.560 0.496
0.353 0.478
0.647 0.478
4.29*** 0.501 0.500
-4.29*** 0.499 0.500
0.396 0.489
0.604 0.489
9.31***
-9.31***
(6) Highly educated
(7) Tenure
0.401 0.490
9.874 9.560
0.423 0.494
8.518 9.620
  -1.04 0.349 0.477
3.35*** 8.334 8.599
0.265 0.442
8.211 7.819
7.93***
   0.65
DATA SOURCE: SLFS 2009 (restricted sample). Own calculations. 
NOTES: Asterisks denote statistically significant differences in means. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and *p<0.10
indicate significance levels.
 
3.3.3  The empirical model 
To test our hypotheses, we estimate a probit model identifying the joint 
effect of being female and part-time employed on the probability of participating in 
employer-provided training. Our regression model is based on the assumption that 
workers receive training if employers expect training benefits B to be higher than 
training costs C, i.e., if net benefits NB are positive: 
NB > 0  (or B >C ).                   (3.6) 
The problem is that net benefits are unobservable. However, we can observe 
whether workers participate in employer-provided training or not and can thus use an 
underlying latent variable model of training as follows: 
NBi
* = !Xi +ui , y = I NB
* > 0!" #$ .              (3.7) 
NBi* refers to the net benefits that are unobserved for the researcher. X’i is a vector 
of variables potentially determining net benefits of training. The indicator function I 
takes the value 1 if NB* > 0. Thus: 
y =1  if NB
* > 0          
y = 0  if NB
* ! 0 .                     (3.8) 
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If net benefits are positive, workers receive employer-provided training, whereas if 
net benefits are negative (or zero), they do not.  
As our dependent variable y is a binary variable and we assume u to have a 
standard normal distribution, we use a probit model to estimate training probabilities. 
The equations that are estimated are versions of:
 
 
Prob yi =1( ) =! !1 x1 +!2  x2 +!P  x1 " x2( )+ !iZii=3
k
#( )
,       
(3.9) 
with ! being a standard normal density function. Prob(yi=1) measures the 
individual’s probability of participating in employer-provided training. Workers 
either participate in employer-provided work-related training (yi=1) or not (yi=0). 
The independent variables on which we focus are binary and indicate part-time 
employment (x1) and female gender (x2). We include an interaction term (x1 * x2) to 
investigate whether working part-time interacts with female gender in influencing the 
probability of receiving employer-provided work-related training. Zi stands for the 
constant term and a set of control variables. 
To investigate the sensitivity of our results, we gradually include four 
groups of control variables. These groups and the corresponding variables are similar 
to those used in classic studies of training, e.g., by Bassanini et al. (2007, chap. 10.5) 
and Oosterbeek (1998). The first group relates to personal characteristics (marital 
status, children dummy, regional dummies, urban dummy, and age dummies); the 
second describes human capital variables (educational dummies, tenure, and tenure 
squared); and the third relates to firm attributes (flexible working time52, fixed-term 
work contract, firm size dummies, and industry dummies). The fourth group covers 
job attributes (occupational dummies and different leadership positions)53.  
  
                                                
52 The dummy “flexible working time” refers to employees who have the freedom to start and end 
their working days flexibly. 
53 To control for occupational segregation, we include narrow occupational categories, i.e., eight 
occupational dummies classified according to the International Standard Classification of Occupation 
(ISCO). To account for different professional status, we include two dummies that describe different 
leadership positions within a company (i.e., a dummy for whether or not an employee has a position in 
management and a dummy for whether or not an employee is a team leader). 
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3.4  Results 
3.4.1  Gender differences in the part-time/full-time training gap 
Table 3.2 presents the estimation results for the probit model given by eq. 
(3.9). We estimate five different model specifications. For specification 1 we include 
our main independent variables (working part-time, being female, and the interaction 
term); for specification 2 to specification 5 we gradually include control variables 
according to the 4 groups (personal characteristics, human capital variables, firm 
attributes and job attributes) described in section 3.3.  
The coefficient of greatest interest—the interaction term between part-time 
employment status and female gender—positively determines the probability of 
participating in training (table 3.2, row 3). The interaction term is statistically 
significant for all specifications except the first, i.e., without considering any 
explanatory variables other than employment status and gender. We thus find the 
part-time training gap to significantly vary by gender. While the coefficient on the 
part-time employment status shows a significant negative effect throughout all 
specifications (see table 3.2, row 1), we find that the coefficient on the interaction is 
significantly positive indicating that the negative impact of part-time employment is 
significantly less pronounced for female workers. Male workers, in contrast, face a 
considerably lower training probability as a consequence of part-time employment.  
These results are in line with the theoretical predictions we derived from 
statistical discrimination theory, i.e., that employers weigh the part-time indicator 
differently for male and female workers (see eq. (3.5) in the theoretical section). 
While for male workers part-time employment is a reliable indicator for (lower) 
future firm attachment, for female workers the indicator does not add meaningful 
information on the top of being female. 
The second row of Table 3.2 shows that being female significantly 
negatively determines the probability of participating in work-related training. 
However, with the introduction of human capital attributes (tenure and dummies for 
different educational levels) in specification 3, the significant female effect 
disappears. We explain this result with the (on average) lower educational level of 
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the female labor force and the considerably high impact of education on training 
participation. Nevertheless, with the inclusion of firm attributes and industry 
dummies in specification 4 and occupational and leadership dummies in specification 
5, the female coefficient is again highly statistically significant. The female 
workforce thus appears disadvantaged in access to employer-provided training even 
after controlling for the level of human capital, firm attributes and industries, and 
occupations. This finding is in line with empirical studies from other countries, 
finding negative effects for women on the probability of receiving work-related 
(employer-provided) training (e.g., Dieckhoff and Steiber, 2011 for workers across 
European countries; Hoque and Bacon, 2008 for British workers; Lynch, 1992 for 
U.S. workers).54 
 
Table 3.2: Probit results for the probability of participating in employer-provided training. 
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 Specification 5
Coef.
[Std. Err.]
Coef.
[Std. Err.]
Coef.
[Std. Err.]
Coef.
[Std. Err.]
Coef.
[Std. Err.]
Part-time -0.256*** -0.282*** -0.302*** -0.363*** -0.266***
[0.055] [0.055] [0.057] [0.059] [0.061]
Female -0.074*** -0.113*** -0.021 -0.142*** -0.112***
[0.025] [0.026] [0.027] [0.029] [0.030]
Part-time * Female 0.072 0.158** 0.156** 0.193*** 0.161**
[0.062] [0.063] [0.066] [0.068] [0.069]
Personal 
Characteristics a yes yes yes yes
Human Capital b yes yes yes
Firm attributes &
Industry c yes yes
Occupation &
Leadership d yes
LR chi2 121.74*** 358.00*** 2302.01*** 3432.15*** 4054.74***
Observations 17,120 17,120 17,120 17,120 17,120
DATA SOURCE: SLFS 2009 (restricted sample). Own calculations.
NOTES: (i) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and *p<0.10 indicate significance levels. (ii) The dependent variable is 
employer-provided work-related training. (iii) The four groups of control variables include: (a) marital
status, children dummy, regional dummies, urban dummy and age dummies (i.e. aged 25-39, aged 40-54,
aged 55-64); (b) seven educational dummies, tenure and tenure squared; (c) dummies for both flexible
working time and fixed-term work contract, firm size dummies (i.e. size < 10, size 10-49, size 50-249) and
nine industry dummies; (d) eight occupational dummies and two leadership position dummies.  
 
                                                
54 At this point, the distinction among different types of training is crucial. When it comes to broader 
training definitions (not employer-provided training in particular), recent empirical studies point to 
training advantages for female workers (e.g., Bassanini et al., 2007). 
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The negative effect for female workers supports the theoretical prediction 
we draw from our adaption of the model on statistical discrimination on employers’ 
training decisions under uncertainty: As the female workforce is highly 
heterogeneous, employers gain no additional information on women’s future firm 
attachment from the individual part-time indicator. Given the lower reliability of 
women’s individual indicator, employers increase the weight towards women’s 
group effect—women’s average future firm attachment. Because of women’s high 
discontinuity in their labor market attachment (as argued previously), women’s firm 
attachment is on average lower than men’s (according to empirical evidence, e.g., 
Light and Ureta, 1992; Royalty, 1996; Sicherman, 1996). Therefore, employers offer 
women on average less training opportunities than men. Given that women’s 
indicators for future firm attachment are less reliable, this uncertainty thus works 
against women. 
The significance and signs of the coefficients of the control variables 
support the theoretical predictions and confirm the findings of previous studies (for 
an overview see Blundell et al., 1996). Moreover, the different model specifications 
support the robustness of our results. The estimates also appear stable and consistent 
across SLFS wave 2006, suggesting that the interaction term plays a significant role 
in determining access to employer-provided training. Results are available from the 
authors upon request. 
To determine the magnitude of the effects, we calculate predicted 
probabilities of training participation for female and male part-timers and full-
timers.55 Table 3.3 summarizes these predicted probabilities. Male full-timers 
participate in training with a probability of 42%, whereas this probability 
significantly and sharply decreases (by 8 percentage points) for male part-timers. In 
contrast, female full-timers have a 38% probability of participating in training, a 
probability considerably lower than that for their male counterparts. However, 
women’s part-time training gap (3 percentage points) is low compared to the gap for 
men (8 percentage points). We thus find that men have a considerably higher 
                                                
55 We base the calculation of the average predicted probabilities on specification 5 in Table 3.2. The 
average predicted probabilities depend on the actual values of the covariates for which we control. 
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reduction in training probabilities when working part-time than comparably situated 
women.56 All of these differences are highly statistically significant. 
 
Table 3.3: Average predicted probabilities of employer-provided training. 
Full-time Part-time Difference Full-time Part-time Difference Difference
(1) (2) (1) - (2) (3) (4) (3) - (4) ((1) - (2)) - ((3) - (4))
42% 33% 8%*** 38% 35% 3%*** 5%***
DATA SOURCE: SLFS 2009 (restricted sample). Own calculations.
Training
NOTES: (i) Asterisks denote statistically significant differences in predicted probabilities. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, and *p<0.10 indicate significance levels. (ii) Average predicted probabilities are calculated based
on specification 5 in Table 3.2. 
Female workersMale workers
 
 
To summarize, our results show that working part-time instead of full-time 
constitutes a serious training disadvantage for male workers. For female workers, 
however, the training provision does not vary substantially by their employment 
status. Hirsch (2005) and Mumford and Smith (2009) find similar results for the part-
time earnings gap: The part-time earnings gap is negative for male workers, but it is 
basically zero for female workers. Finding comparable result patterns for the part-
time training and the part-time earnings gap is not surprising, considering existing 
empirical studies that find a positive relationship between past trainings investments 
and workers’ wages (e.g., Bassanini et al., 2007 for Europe; Frazis and Loewenstein, 
2005 for employer-provided training in the U.S.; Lee, 2009 for federally funded job 
training in the U.S.). 
3.4.2  Further discussion and robustness checks 
To assess the robustness of our results, in this section we run estimations for 
different sub-groups of individuals that might differ in their firm attachment and thus 
in their training probabilities. For each sub-group, Table 3.4 shows the effects of 
working part-time, being female, and the interaction effect (part-time * female) on 
the probability of participating in employer-provided training. Table 3.5 presents 
                                                
56 Part-timers partly substitute the lower probability of participating in employer-provided training by 
higher self-investments especially when they have a high learning motivation and a clear vision of 
their future development (Nelen and de Grip, 2009). 
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average predicted training probabilities for these sub-groups. The results remain 
stable across the different sub-groups and confirm our two hypotheses.  
First, we examine whether the results differ between part-timers currently 
working 20-49% and part-timers working 50-90% of full-time working hours. We 
find that the results for the interaction term remain consistent for these two groups of 
part-time workers (table 3.4, estimations 1 and 2). However, a comparison of 
predicted training probabilities shows systematic differences between these two 
groups of part-time workers: We observe that reducing the working hours to 50-90% 
of full-time working hours constitutes a non-significant training difference for 
women, but a significant and high training difference for men (table 3.5, row 2). The 
training disadvantage for male part-timers is even more prevalent when working 
hours are reduced to 20-49% of full-time working hours (table 3.5, row 1). 
Therefore, for male workers any reduction in the number of working hours 
(compared to working full-time) is associated with a training disadvantage. In 
contrast, for female workers we only find a part-time training gap for a substantial 
reduction in working hours (i.e., for working 20-49% of full-time working hours).  
According to human capital theory, we would, however, expect that any 
reduction in the number of working hours is associated with a lower training 
probability. The persisting part-time training gap between women and men indicates 
that employers use part-time employment at present as an indicator for future firm 
attachment and that they use this indicator differently for women and men when 
investing in workers’ human capital. These results support our theoretical 
considerations on training decisions under uncertainty. 
Second, as we confine the focus to women and men with significant firm 
attachments, we restrict the sample to those with a minimum of three years of tenure. 
Within this sub-group we exclude training with the sole function of introductory job 
training. We find that the results remain consistent for this sub-group of workers with 
more than three years tenure (see table 3.4, estimation 3). The part-time training gap 
remains thus significantly different for women and men (7 percentage points) (table 
3.5, row 3).   
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Table 3.4: Probit results for the probability of participating in employer-provided training for 
different sub-groups. 
Sub-Groups (1) - (3) (1) (2) (3)
Part-timers 
20%-49%
Part-timers
50%-90%
Tenure > = 
3 years
Coef.
[Std. Err.]
Coef.
[Std. Err.]
Coef.
[Std. Err.]
Part-time -0.403*** -0.222*** -0.283***
[0.110] [0.064] [0.075]
Female -0.102*** -0.106*** -0.128***
[0.031] [0.030] [0.037]
Part-time * Female 0.230** 0.175** 0.219***
[0.117] [0.073] [0.085]
LR chi2 3577.24*** 3741.11*** 2812.77***
Observations 14,588 15,843 11,662
Sub-Groups (4) - (7) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Higher
education
Lower
education
Part-time 
occupations
Non-part-time 
occupations
Coef.
[Std. Err.]
Coef.
[Std. Err.]
Coef.
[Std. Err.]
Coef.
[Std. Err.]
Part-time -0.239*** -0.312*** -0.262** -0.271***
[0.086] [0.086] [0.105] [0.074]
Female -0.0436 -0.162*** -0.102** -0.129***
[0.046] [0.040] [0.047] [0.039]
Part-time * Female 0.0407 0.254*** 0.137 0.168*
[0.102] [0.095] [0.115] [0.087]
LR chi2 661.09*** 2101.92*** 1241.9*** 2872.93***
Observations 6,146 10,974 6,029 11,091
DATA SOURCE: SLFS 2009 (restricted sample). Own calculations.
NOTES: (i) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and *p<0.10 indicate significance levels. (ii) The dependent 
variable is employer-provided work-related training and estimations are based on specification 5 
in Table 3.2. (iii) The sub-groups refer to: (1) part-timers working 20-49% and (2) part-timers 
working 50-90% of full-time working hours; (3) workers with a minimum of three years tenure; 
(4) highly educated workers (including workers with a higher vocational education or a university 
degree) and (5) non-highly educated workers; (6) occupations favored by part-time workers and 
(7) occupations less favored by part-time workers.  
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Table 3.5: Average predicted probabilities of employer-provided training for different sub-groups. 
Difference
Full-time Part-time Difference Full-time Part-time Difference ((1) - (2)) -
(1) (2) (1) - (2) (3) (4) (3) - (4) ((3) - (4))
(1) Part-timers 20%-49% 41% 29% 12*** 38% 32% 5*** 7**
(2) Part-timers 50%-90% 42% 35% 7*** 39% 37% 2 5**
Male workers Female workers
(3) Tenure > = 3 years 42% 33% 9*** 38% 36% 2 7***
(4) Higher education 60% 51% 9*** 58% 51% 7*** 2
(5) Lower education 32% 23% 9*** 27% 25% 2 7***
(6) Part-time occup. 46% 38% 9** 43% 39% 4** 5
(7) Non-part-time occup. 39% 31% 8*** 35% 32% 3** 5**
NOTES: (i) Asterisks denote statistically significant differences in predicted probabilities. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, and *p<0.10 indicate significance levels. (ii) The dependent variable is employer-provided work-
related training and estimations are based on specification 5 in Table 3.2. (iii) See notes under Table 3.4 for
descriptions of sub-groups (1) to (7).
DATA SOURCE: SLFS 2009 (restricted sample). Own calculations.
 
 
Third, as better-educated workers are generally more likely to receive 
employer-provided training (e.g., Arulampalam et al., 2004), we further analyze 
whether the interaction term remains significant for workers with different 
educational backgrounds. We run separate regressions for highly educated workers 
(including workers with a higher vocational education or a university degree) and 
low-educated workers. Whereas our results remain robust for low-educated workers, 
we find that women and men with a higher education have comparable training 
probabilities independent of their employment status. The female effect on the 
training probability is not statistically significant, nor is the interaction effect (table 
3.4, estimation 4). Moreover, predicted probabilities of training in Table 3.5 (row 4) 
show that highly educated women and men have the highest average training 
probability in full-time employment—at least compared to the other presented 
specifications—at 58% and 60%, respectively. This result indicates that women with 
higher educational degrees may be less exposed to gender discrimination, a result 
consistent with the finding of existing studies in which scholars investigated wage 
discrimination in labor markets (e.g., Montgomery and Powell, 2003). 
However, both highly educated female and male part-timers suffer from a 
substantial drawback, as their training probability decreases by 7 and 9 percentage 
points, respectively, when working part-time. We suggest that a higher education 
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might also be an individual indicator that firms use in conjunction with the part-time 
indicator to predict workers’ firm attachment. While the reliability of part-time 
employment strongly varies by gender for low-educated workers, firms seem to infer 
no different information for part-time employment status of highly educated workers 
regardless of workers’ gender. Assuming that highly educated part-timers do differ in 
their working hours but not in their expected tenure from their full-time counterparts, 
the finding is consistent with human capital theory. For highly educated part-timers 
there are less working hours to recoup the training investment than for similar full-
timers. 
The last robustness check deals with the finding of wage-related studies, 
that the part-time/full-time earnings gap is a result of occupational downgrading 
(e.g., Connolly and Gregory, 2009). We analyze whether the results for occupations 
favored by part-time workers (i.e., part-time occupations) differ from the results for 
occupations less favored by part-time workers (i.e., non-part-time occupations). 
Table 3.4 (estimations 6 and 7) shows that the results remain consistent for non-part-
time occupations. In contrast, the interaction effect is not statistically significant for 
part-time occupations. We suggest that female and male part-timers are equally more 
likely to remain part-time employed in part-time occupations, because working part-
time in part-time occupations (where part-timers are less in competition with full-
time workers) might constitute less of a disadvantage.  
Taken together, the interaction term is—where theoretically expected—
statistically significant. Our results remain thus stable across the different sub-
samples (table 3.4). Whereas all training differences between male part-timers and 
full-timers are significant and high in size (ranging from 7 to 12 percentage points) 
(table 3.5), the training differences between female part-timers and full-timers are 
rather small (ranging from non-significant differences to significant differences of 3 
to 7 percentage points) (table 3.5). In sum, we find that the difference-in-difference, 
i.e., the part-time/full-time training gap between female and male workers is 
significant and ranges from 5 to 7 percentage points. Therefore, part-time 
employment is in general much less favorable for male than for female workers, at 
least for the probability of participating in employer-provided training. 
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3.5  Conclusions 
This chapter demonstrates that men in part-time employment receive much 
less training than men in full-time employment. This gap becomes even more 
prevalent when men in part-time employment considerably reduce their working 
hours (i.e., to less than 50% of full-time working hours). For women, however, 
working part-time or full-time makes a minor difference, if any at all, in training 
participation. In particular, we find no training disadvantage for women with only a 
slight reduction in the number of working hours as compared to their full-time 
counterparts.  
These results are consistent with our theoretical predictions from both 
human capital theory and statistical discrimination theory and support our model of 
employers’ training decisions under uncertainty. We assume that employers use part-
time employment status as an observable indicator to predict workers’ future firm 
attachment, which is an unobservable characteristic relevant in employers’ training 
decisions. Our adapted model of statistical discrimination theory suggests that 
employers weigh the part-time indicator differently by gender. While for men part-
time employment status is a reliable indicator for a lower future firm attachment, the 
part-time indicator adds no reliable information for women (on top of being female). 
For women, employers therefore rely on previous statistical experience, i.e., 
women’s average firm attachment, which is markedly lower than men’s. Women, on 
average, thus have a lower probability of receiving employer-provided training than 
men. 
The described model of employers’ training decisions under uncertainty can 
be generalized and can, for example, be applied to investigate other potential 
indicators relevant for training decisions, such as parental leave in general or 
mandatory paternity leave in particular. The main objective for employers is to find 
reliable individual indicators that reduce their uncertainty about returns on training 
induced by differences in workers’ future firm attachment. In addition, the model 
may be applied to investigate the effect of part-time status as an indicator on labor 
market outcomes other than training participation, such as career opportunities or job 
assignments.  
 Chapter 3: New insights on the part-time training gap: How different are women and men? 
 
76 
The finding that part-time employment for women is not necessarily related 
to unfavorable labor market outcomes (i.e., lower earnings and less employer-
provided training) indicates that part-time (as opposed to full-time) employment is 
more attractive for women than for men. Women “pay the price” merely by virtue of 
being female. Inequality arises for individual female workers who do not fit the 
stereotype of women (i.e., who do not generally have a low firm attachment). Given 
this result, the challenge for policymakers is to find a way of ensuring that employers 
do not restrict training access for women in general. 
At the same time, the finding that the part-time training gap is significantly 
negative for male workers indicates that part-time employment places men at a 
disadvantage relative to their full-time counterparts. The lower probability of 
employer-provided training makes part-time employment unattractive for men with 
regard to career prospects. More equal (training) opportunities will only evolve if a 
much larger number of men works part-time (for whatever reason). Only then would 
male part-timers become a more heterogeneous group of workers, in turn making the 
part-time indicator less reliable and reducing their part-time/full-time training gap. 
Therefore, policy measures that support male part-timers would become self-
sustainable because they would reduce the training or career disadvantages 
associated with part-time work. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
 
FINAL REMARKS 
 
 
 
 
This doctoral thesis aimed at contributing to research on educational 
investments under uncertainty by carrying out thorough empirical studies from two 
different angles: (1) students’ decision making about educational investments in 
upper secondary education and (2) employers’ decision making about the provision 
of training to their workers. Standard human capital theory has shown that both 
students and employers only invest in education if their investments pay off. Both 
decision makers, however, face uncertainty when investing in education: While 
students face uncertainty about costs and benefits of schooling, employers deal 
mainly with uncertainty about workers’ future firm attachment that determines their 
investment benefits to a large amount. While both theoretical and empirical literature 
acknowledged the existence of uncertainty in educational investments, many 
empirical studies on this topic neglect to account for heterogeneities among 
individuals.  
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This doctoral thesis shows in a series of empirical investigations that 
heterogeneities in individual preferences and behavior patterns lead to different 
investment strategies among both students and employers. The thesis makes two 
major contributions. The first substantial research progress is achieved through the 
empirical investigations conducted in the first two chapters. The presented evidence 
clearly shows that differences in the degrees of patience among students lead to 
different educational investment decisions in the vocational education and training 
programs. Whereas in chapter one, the results show that students’ degrees of patience 
determine whether or not they leave an educational program before graduation, in 
chapter two, the findings suggest that students’ degrees of patience determine how 
they respond to financial incentives. The second substantial research progress is 
achieved through the empirical investigation conducted in the third chapter. The 
presented results show that unobservable heterogeneity in behavioral patterns among 
part-time workers leads employers—when deciding about training provision—to use 
the part-time indicator differently for female and male workers. As a result, female 
and male (part-time) workers are treated differently on the labor market, at least for 
the probability of participating in employer-provided training. Overall, given our 
findings, heterogeneities among individuals clearly deserve attention in the analysis 
of human capital investment decisions in general and in the evaluation of 
intervention programs in particular.  
The first chapter contributes to the research on dropout behavior by 
shedding light on how students’ degrees of patience determine their probability of 
dropping out of education. We find that patient students have a lower probability of 
dropping out of the vocational training program than less patient students. This 
finding is consistent with a human capital investment model (Manski, 1989 and 
Altonji, 1993) in which students sequentially reconsider their schooling investment 
decisions while attending school: Incorporating new information about schooling 
costs and benefits, less patient students are more likely to leave an educational 
program before graduation as a result of their unfavorable cost-benefit ratio. The 
finding calls for interventions that, among others, specifically address the 
shortcomings of students with lower degrees of patience. Interventions may aim at 
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reducing the probability of information updates (by contributing to well-founded 
educational choices), decreasing perceived short-term schooling costs, or increasing 
short-term schooling benefits. Whether particularly short-term financial incentives 
are a means of bridging the gap is examined in the second chapter of this thesis. 
The second chapter makes a significant contribution to research on financial 
incentives in education. Existing studies on this subject typically find that financial 
incentives can have either positive effects, no effects, or even negative effects (see, 
among others, Angrist et al., 2009; Angrist and Lavy, 2009; Fryer, 2011; Leuven et 
al., 2010). The presented analysis deepens the understanding of systematic 
differences in the responsiveness to incentives by showing that highly impatient 
students respond more strongly to the incentives by increasing their student 
performance more than patient students. This result is in line with our hypothesis 
derived from human capital theory (see Becker, 1962; Blinder and Weiss, 1976; 
Borghans and Golsteyn, 2006): While students generally raise their student 
performance when marginal benefits increase, less patient students respond more 
strongly to short-term financial incentives because at least part of the investment 
benefits can be derived much closer to the investment. This finding particularly 
deserves attention when evaluating the efficacy of schooling intervention programs. 
Finding zero average program effects is by no means the end of the story. Moreover, 
the presented finding may assist policy makers in the design of interventions 
suggesting that the provision of financial incentives might be most effective at the 
beginning of educational programs when real labor market benefits are discounted 
the most. 
Finally, the third chapter contributes to the research on employer-provided 
training both by providing an innovative model on employers’ training decisions 
under uncertainty and by empirically examining whether the part-time/full-time 
training gap differs by gender. Empirical research on employer-provided training has 
thus far focused on the average part-time/full-time training gap in general and has 
thereby neglected that part-timers are a heterogeneous group of workers. Indeed, our 
findings suggest that there are systematic gender differences in the access to 
employer-provided training: For men, working part-time instead of full-time 
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constitutes a serious disadvantage in access to employer-provided training; for 
women, however, working part-time instead of full-time constitutes only a minor 
difference. This finding is consistent with the presented model on employers’ 
training decisions under uncertainty. Employers, when deciding about training 
provision, use observable indicators (such as the part-time employment status) to 
predict workers’ future firm attachment. Given the gender-dependent reliability of 
the part-time indicator, employers use different investment strategies for female and 
male part-time workers. As for female workers the part-time indicator does not add 
any meaningful information on the top of being female, part-time employment is as 
attractive as full-time employment for female workers. However, women “pay the 
price” merely by virtue of being female. Male workers, in contrast, face considerably 
lower training probabilities as a consequence of part-time employment. Given these 
results, the challenge is to find a way of ensuring that employers do not restrict 
training access for women in general and for men in part-time employment. 
The empirical findings and their possible policy implications described in 
this thesis point toward (at least) three avenues for future research. First, whereas the 
results of the first chapter indicate that less patient students have a higher probability 
of dropping out of upper secondary education, less is known about appropriate 
dropout interventions that particularly target the needs of less patient students. Future 
research may contribute by investigating students’ responsiveness to dropout 
interventions. Most helpful would be investigations that simultaneously evaluate the 
efficacy of different dropout interventions to ensure that their impacts (among less 
patient students) are comparable.  
Second, while the results of the second chapter indicate that highly 
impatient students respond more strongly to financial incentives by increasing their 
student performance more than patient students, less is known about the most cost-
effective features of such incentive programs. Future research may add to existing 
literature on financial incentive programs by investigating the optimal design of such 
interventions ensuring to maximize the responsiveness of students.  
Third, whereas the result of the third chapter suggests that employers use 
observable indicators to predict workers’ future firm attachment and thus to reduce 
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their uncertainty when investing in training, less is known about how workers who 
do not fit certain stereotypes can believably signal their future firm attachment. 
Further research may close this gap both by examining the relative reliability of 
observable indicators and by investigating how different groups of workers can 
efficiently use these indicators to signal their future firm attachment. Reducing the 
uncertainty of employers’ training decisions would reduce training (and thus career) 
disadvantages for both men in part-time employment and women in the labor market 
in general. 
Finally, returning to the example of whether or not to return to academia, I 
have updated information and learned throughout my Ph.D. that not only the 
opportunity costs but even more so the time, effort, and dedication devoted to 
pursuing a Ph.D. are tremendous. Facing still uncertainty about the labor market 
benefits of higher education, the thesis clearly shows that higher noncognitive skills 
(such as being considerably patient) are definitely to one’s advantage if one is to 
successfully complete a Ph.D. (over entering the labor market with a master’s 
degree). Just as important, however, is that the Ph.D. experience entails much more 
than the costs of merely doing work in a specific field of research—it is fun. 
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 Fragebogen 
„Lernende und ihre Erfahrungen im 1. Grundbildungsjahr“ 
 
Ein Projekt der Universität Zürich 
in Kooperation mit dem Mittelschul- und Berufsbildungsamt des Kantons Zürich 
 
 
Im vergangenen Herbst, zu Beginn Ihres ersten Grundbildungsjahres, haben Sie bereits ein 
erstes Mal an unserer Studie teilgenommen. Wir freuen uns, dass Sie auch heute wieder an 
unserer Studie teilnehmen. Im Rahmen dieser Befragung interessiert uns, wie es Ihnen in 
Ihrem ersten Lehrjahr erging und wie Ihre heutige Ausbildungssituation aussieht. Wir 
bitten Sie, alle Fragen in Bezug auf die im Sommer/Herbst 09 begonnene Berufslehre 
zu beantworten. 
 
Bitte lesen Sie jede Aussage genau durch und kreuzen Sie als Antwort die Kategorie an, 
die Ihrer Sichtweise am Besten entspricht. 
 
Ihre Angaben werden streng vertraulich behandelt und alle Daten anonymisiert 
gespeichert und ausgewertet. Rückschlüsse auf Ihre Person sind damit unmöglich. 
 
Mitmachen und einen iPod touch gewinnen! 
Unter allen Teilnehmenden, die einen ausgefüllten Fragebogen einreichen, verlosen wir 
als Dankeschön zwei iPod touch. Die Verlosung  findet statt, sobald alle Fragebogen 
eingegangen sind, spätestens aber am 30. November 2010. Die Gewinnerinnen und 
Gewinner werden persönlich benachrichtigt. 
 
Herzlichen Dank für Ihre wertvolle Mitarbeit! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Name: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Vorname: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Klasse: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Universität Zürich 
ISU – Institut für Strategie und Unternehmensökonomik 
Lehrstuhl für BWL, 
insbes. empirische Methodik 
der Arbeitsbeziehungen und 
der Personalökonomik 
Plattenstrasse 14 
CH-8032 Zürich 
Tel. +41 44 634 42 81 
Fax +41 44 634 43 70 
backes-gellner@isu.unizh.ch 
www.unizh.ch/isu/emap/index.htm 
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B   Survey 2010 
  
 Additional Material for Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 
 
105 
- 2 - 
Fragebogen 
„Lernende und ihre Erfahrungen im 1. Grundbildungsjahr“ 
 
               A. Beruf    
 
1. Im Sommer/Herbst 09 haben Sie Ihre Grundbildung in einem bestimmten Beruf begonnen (z.B. Polymechaniker;  
   Elektroinstallateur; Kaufmann/Kauffrau). Bitte denken Sie jetzt nur an diesen Beruf.   
  Wie stark treffen folgende Aussagen (unabhängig von Ihrem Ausbildungsbetrieb) auf Sie zu? 
  
 
 
          B. Fragen zur aktuellen Ausbildungssituation                                 
 
1. Haben Sie Ihr Ausbildungsprofil im letzten Jahr gewechselt? !  nein !  ja und zwar von  
                        ! Profil B auf E  ! Profil E auf B 
                        ! Profil M auf E ! Profil E auf M 
                        ! Profil G auf E  ! Profil E auf G 
                        ! anderes _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
2. Machen Sie zurzeit eine zweijährige Grundbildung mit Berufsattest? !  nein     ! ja 
 
3. Wurde Ihr damals abgeschlossener Lehrvertrag in der Zwischenzeit aufgelöst? 
 
Nein ! Falls nein, bitte weiter mit den Fragen zum Lehrbetrieb - Block C.
Ja   
 
4. Bitte beantworten Sie die folgenden Aussagen mit richtig oder falsch. 
  
 
richtig falsch
a) Die Initiative für die Lehrvertragsauflösung ging von meiner Seite aus. r f
b) Der Vertrag wurde im gegenseitigen Einverständnis aufgelöst. r f
c) Der Vertrag wurde durch Konkurs bzw. Betriebsschliessung aufgelöst. r f
 
 
 
5. Nach wie vielen Monaten haben Sie Ihren damaligen Lehrvertrag aufgelöst?  Nach _ _ _ _ _ _ Monat(en). 
 
 
6. Warum wurde Ihr damaliger Lehrvertrag aufgelöst (falls nicht durch Konkurs oder Betriebsschliessung) bzw. 
 warum haben Sie gekündigt? 
 
 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
  
 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
   
 
Bitte weiter auf der Rückseite. 
 
völlig völlig
falsch richtig
a) Die beruflichen Anforderungen entsprechen exakt meinen Vorstellungen. 1 2 3 4 5
b) Mit den Weiterbildungsaussichten im Beruf bin ich sehr zufrieden. 1 2 3 4 5
c) Mit den Aufstiegsmöglichkeiten im Beruf bin ich sehr zufrieden. 1 2 3 4 5
d) Mit den Einkommensaussichten im Beruf bin ich sehr zufrieden. 1 2 3 4 5
e) Mit den Weiterbeschäftigungsaussichten im Beruf bin ich sehr zufrieden. 1 2 3 4 5
f) Mein Beruf wurde mir im Vorfeld zu positiv dargestellt. 1 2 3 4 5
g) Mein derzeitiger Beruf entspricht meinem Wunschberuf. 1 2 3 4 5
Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile ein Kreuz.
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7. Falls Sie Ihren Lehrvertrag aufgelöst haben, sind Sie derzeit wieder in einem Lehrbetrieb in Ausbildung?  
 
Ja, in einem anderen Beruf, nämlich _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Ja, in einem anderen Betrieb, nämlich _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Nein
Falls ja, bitte weiter mit den Fragen 
zum Lehrbetrieb - Block C.
           
8. Sie stehen zurzeit in keinem Lehrverhältnis. Wie würden Sie Ihre aktuelle berufliche Situation beschreiben? 
 Bitte beantworten Sie die folgenden Aussagen mit „ja“, „nein, aber geplant“ oder „nein“. 
 
 
Ich bin derzeit … nein, aber
ja geplant nein
... Schüler/in einer allgemeinen Schule (z.B. Gymnasium). j g n
... als ungelernter Arbeiter oder Angestellter beschäftigt. j g n
... im Militärdienst. j g n
... arbeitslos. j n
Wie würden Sie ihre aktuelle Situation beschreiben, falls keine der Aussagen auf Sie zutrifft?
Ich bin zurzeit  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _.    
 
9. Planen Sie früher oder später wieder eine Berufslehre zu starten?  
 
nein ja, in einem anderen Beruf, ja, in einem anderen Betrieb,
nämlich _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ nämlich _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
 
 
               C. Lehrbetrieb  
 
1. Beziehen Sie Leistungslohn? (= Lohn, der abhängig ist von Ihrer Leistung in der Schule oder im Betrieb) 
 
Ja, basierend auf der Leistung in der Schule (Noten) in der Höhe von _ _ _ _ _ _ und_ _ _ _ _ _ SFr. 
Ja, basierend auf der Leistung im Betrieb in der Höhe von  _ _ _ _ _ _ und_ _ _ _ _ _ SFr. 
Nein.  
 
2. Wie viele Mitarbeiter hat der Betrieb, bei dem Sie zurzeit tätig sind? 
 
1 bis 9 10 bis 49 50 - 99 100 - 499 500 und mehr
 
 
3. Denken Sie jetzt bitte an Ihren Lehrbetrieb. Wie stark treffen folgende Aussagen auf Sie zu? 
 
 
 
 
völlig völlig
falsch richtig
a) Meine Tätigkeiten im Betrieb sind stark berufsbezogen. 1 2 3 4 5
b) Die Ausbildungsinhalte werden im Betrieb sehr gut vermittelt. 1 2 3 4 5
c) Ich bin zufrieden mit dem Reglement bezüglich Überstunden und Ferien. 1 2 3 4 5
d) Mit meinem Lehrlingslohn bin ich vollkommen zufrieden. 1 2 3 4 5
e) Mein Umgang mit den Berufsbildnern und Chefs im Betrieb ist konfliktfrei. 1 2 3 4 5
f) Mein Umgang mit den Arbeitskollegen(-innen) im Betrieb ist konfliktfrei. 1 2 3 4 5
g) Im Lehrbetrieb verrichte ich schwere körperliche Arbeit. 1 2 3 4 5
h) Im Betrieb bin ich vollkommen mit Arbeit ausgelastet. 1 2 3 4 5
i) Ich bin mit meiner Arbeit im Betrieb häufig überfordert. 1 2 3 4 5
j) Ich bin mit meiner Arbeit im Betrieb häufig unterfordert. 1 2 3 4 5
k) Ich bleibe dem Lehrbetrieb aus diversen Gründen häufig fern. 1 2 3 4 5
Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile ein Kreuz.
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             D. Berufsfachschule   
 
Die folgenden Fragen zu Berufsfachschule beziehen sich auf die im Sommer/Herbst 09 begonnene Berufsausbildung. 
Uns interessiert, wie es Ihnen im ersten Grundbildungsjahr dort erging. 
 
1. Denken Sie jetzt bitte an Ihre Berufsfachschule. Wie stark treffen folgende Aussagen für Sie zu?  
 
2. Wenn Sie an Ihr letztes Semesterzeugnis der Berufsfachschule denken, welche Noten haben Sie erzielt? 
 
 
Bitte Noten aus dem letzten Semesterzeugnis eintragen.
Mathematik: Fach nicht besucht.
Englisch: Fach nicht besucht.
Deutsch: Fach nicht besucht.
W&G (Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft): Fach nicht besucht.
FRW (Finanz- und Rechnungswesen): Fach nicht besucht.
VBR (Volksw.; Betriebsw.; Recht): Fach nicht besucht.
Zeugnisdurchschnitt:
 
 
3. Wenn Sie an den Ausbildungsbericht des Lehrbetriebes denken, welche Durchschnittsnote haben Sie erhalten?  
 
 
Note der letzten ALS: 
 
 
4. Wenn Sie an die letzte Prozesseinheit denken, die Sie im Betrieb verfasst haben, welche Note haben Sie erzielt? 
  
 
Note der letzten 
Prozesseinheit:  
 
                   
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
 
Bitte weiter auf der Rückseite.
völlig völlig
falsch richtig
a) Die Unterrichtsinhalte sind perfekt auf meinen Ausbildungsberuf abgestimmt. 1 2 3 4 5
b) Der Unterricht ist sehr verständlich. 1 2 3 4 5
c) Ich bin in der Schule häufig unterfordert. 1 2 3 4 5
d) Ich bin in der Schule häufig überfordert. 1 2 3 4 5
e) Ich fühle mich in der Schule oft gestresst. 1 2 3 4 5
f) Ich habe grosse Prüfungsangst. 1 2 3 4 5
g) Ich stehe häufig in Konflikt mit Lehrpersonen. 1 2 3 4 5
h) Ich stehe häufig in Konflikt mit Klassenkameraden. 1 2 3 4 5
i) Ich bleibe vom Schulunterricht häufig fern. 1 2 3 4 5
Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile ein Kreuz.
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              E. Persönliche Situation                                                    
 
  
1. Wie viele Freund/innen haben Sie zurzeit?      
 bis zu 10   10 bis 20   mehr als 20 
  !          !      ! 
 
2. Wenn Sie nun nur an Ihre fünf besten Freund/innen denken, was machen diese zurzeit? 
 
 
Bitte die zutreffenden Haupttätigkeiten der 5 besten Freunde ankreuzen. Mehrfachantworten sind möglich.
Lernender, Schüler, Student
Lehrabbrecher, Schulabbrecher
Berufstätig, nach bereits abgeschlossener Grundbildung
Berufstätig, ohne Ausbildungsabschluss
Arbeitslos
Andere Haupttätigkeit, nämlich _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
 
 
3. Wenn Sie an Ihre persönliche Situation denken, wie zutreffend sind die folgenden Aussagen? 
  
 
4. Bitte geben Sie hier Ihre Adresse an, damit wir Ihnen im Fall eines Gewinnes den iPod touch zusenden können: 
  
 _____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Strasse, Hausnummer 
  
 _____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 PLZ und Wohnort 
 
5. Sind Sie im vergangenen Jahr bei Ihren Eltern ausgezogen? Ja ! Nein ! 
 
6. Gerne lassen wir Ihnen via Email eine kurze Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse zukommen. 
 Wie lautet Ihre private Emailadresse?  
  
  ___________________________________________________ @_______________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
völlig völlig
falsch richtig
a) Ich bin mir aus heutiger Sicht sehr sicher, dass ich die Lehre abschliessen werde. 1 2 3 4 5
b) Meine Eltern unterstützen mich in meinen beruflichen Vorhaben immer. 1 2 3 4 5
c) Mit meinem Leben als Ganzes bin ich sehr zufrieden. 1 2 3 4 5
d) Ich fühle mich im Allgemeinen sehr gesund. 1 2 3 4 5
e) Gesundheitliche Probleme erschweren mir die Ausübung meines Berufes . 1 2 3 4 5
f) Meine finanzielle Situation belastet mich sehr. 1 2 3 4 5
g) Die meisten meiner heutigen Freunde habe ich im letzten Jahr kennen gelernt. 1 2 3 4 5
h) Für meine Schulkollegen/innen sind gute Noten sehr wichtig. 1 2 3 4 5
i) Ich bin von einer schlimmen familiären Veränderung betroffen. 1 2 3 4 5
(z.B. Scheidung, Arbeitslosigkeit Vater oder Mutter, Todesfall, Krankheit)
j) Ich bin von einer schlimmen ausserfamiliären Veränderung betroffen. 1 2 3 4 5
(z.B. Todesfall innerhalb der Schulklasse, am Ausbildungsplatz)
Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile ein Kreuz.
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Wenn Sie uns noch Kommentare oder Bemerkungen zukommen lassen möchten, können Sie diese hier notieren. 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
 
 
So, nun haben Sie es geschafft. Haben Sie alle Fragen beantwortet? 
Für Ihre Mithilfe bedanken wir uns ganz herzlich! 
 
Auf Ihrem weiteren beruflichen Weg wünschen wir Ihnen alles Gute. 
 
 
Da es aus wissenschaftlicher Sicht interessant ist, Veränderungen über die Zeit zu beobachten, würden wir uns freuen, wenn 
wir Sie auch in Zukunft nochmals kontaktieren dürften. 
 
Falls Sie Fragen an uns haben, können Sie sich jederzeit bei uns melden. 
 
 
Prof. Uschi Backes-Gellner und Yvonne Oswald (yvonne.oswald@isu.uzh.ch) 
Lehrstuhl für Betriebswirtschaftslehre, insbes. empirische Methodik der Arbeitsbeziehungen und der Personalökonomik 
Plattenstrasse 14 
CH-8032 Zürich 
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Institut für  
Betriebswirtschaftslehre 
 
Universität Zürich 
Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre 
Lehrstuhl für BWL, insbes. empirische Methodik der 
Arbeitsbeziehungen und der Personalökonomik 
Plattenstrasse 14 
CH-8032 Zürich 
Telefon  +41 44 634 42 76 
http://www.business.uzh.ch/professorships/emap 
 
 
   
 
 
Fragebogen  
„Lernende und ihre Erfahrungen im Lehrjahr 2010/2011“ 
 
Ein Projekt der Universität Zürich 
in Kooperation mit dem Mittelschul- und Berufsbildungsamt des Kantons Zürich 
 
 
Seit Beginn Ihrer beruflichen Ausbildung haben Sie bereits zwei Mal an unserer Studie teilgenommen. 
Wir freuen uns deshalb, dass Sie auch heute wieder bereit sind an unserer Befragung teilzunehmen. Im 
Rahmen dieser Befragung interessiert uns, wie es Ihnen in Ihrem vergangenen Lehrjahr erging und wie 
Ihre heutige Ausbildungssituation aussieht. 
 
Wichtig: Wir bitten Sie, alle Fragen in Bezug auf das vergangene Lehrjahr 2010/11 zu 
beantworten. Bitte lesen Sie jede Aussage genau durch und kreuzen Sie als Antwort die Kategorie an, 
die Ihrer Sichtweise am Besten entspricht. 
 
Ihre Angaben werden streng vertraulich behandelt und alle Daten anonymisiert gespeichert und 
ausgewertet. Rückschlüsse auf Ihre Person sind damit unmöglich. 
 
Mitmachen und einen iPod touch gewinnen! 
Unter allen Teilnehmenden, die einen komplett ausgefüllten Fragebogen einreichen, verlosen wir als 
Dankeschön drei iPod touch (pro Schule einen iPod). Die Verlosung  findet statt, sobald alle 
Fragebogen eingegangen sind, spätestens am 30. November 2011. Die Gewinnerinnen und Gewinner 
werden persönlich benachrichtigt. Über den Wettbewerb wird keine Korrespondenz geführt. 
 
Herzlichen Dank für Ihre wertvolle Mitarbeit! 
 
 
 
 
Name:   ___________________________________________ 
 
 
Vorname: ___________________________________________ 
 
 
Klasse:  ___________________________________________ 
 
C   Survey 2011 
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Fragebogen - „Lernende und ihre Erfahrungen im Lehrjahr 2010/2011“ 
 
 
          A. Fragen zur aktuellen Ausbildungssituation                                 
 
1. Haben Sie Ihr Ausbildungsprofil im vergangenen Schuljahr 2010/2011 gewechselt?  
 ! nein  ! ja und zwar von  ! Profil B auf E  ! Profil E auf B 
           ! Profil M auf E ! Profil E auf M 
           ! Profil G auf E  ! Profil E auf G 
           ! anderes _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
 
2. Wurde Ihr Lehrvertrag im vergangenen Schuljahr 2010/2011 aufgelöst? 
 ! nein    !  Falls nein, bitte direkt weiter mit den Fragen zum Lehrbetrieb – Block B. 
 ! ja 
 
3. Bitte beantworten Sie die folgenden Aussagen mit richtig oder falsch. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Falls der Vertrag nicht durch Konkurs oder Betriebsschliessung aufgelöst wurde, warum wurde Ihr  
 Lehrvertrag  aufgelöst bzw. warum haben Sie gekündigt? 
 
 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
  
 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
5. Nach wie vielen  Lehrjahren und Monaten haben Sie diesen Lehrvertrag aufgelöst?   
  
 Nach _ _ _ _ _ _  Lehrjahr(en) und _ _ _ _ _ _  Monat(en). 
 
6. Sind Sie nach der Lehrvertragsauflösung wieder in einem Lehrbetrieb in Ausbildung? 
 (Mehrfachantworten möglich) 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
7.  Sie stehen zurzeit in keinem Lehrverhältnis. Wie würden Sie Ihre aktuelle berufliche Situation beschreiben? 
 Bitte beantworten Sie die folgenden Aussagen mit „ja“, „nein, aber geplant“ oder „nein“. 
  
  
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Planen Sie früher oder später wieder eine Berufslehre zu starten?  
 
 
 
Bitte weiter auf der Rückseite. 
Ja, in einem anderen Beruf: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Ja, in einem anderen Betrieb: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Ja, ich mache eine zweijährige Grundausbildung mit Berufsattest.
Nein
Falls ja,  bitte weiter mit den 
Fragen zum Lehrbetrieb - 
Block B.
richtig falsch
a) Die Initiative für die Lehrvertragsauflösung ging von meiner Seite aus. r
b) Die Initiative für die Lehrvertragsauflösung ging vom Arbeitgeber aus. r
c) Der Vertrag wurde im gegenseitigen Einverständnis aufgelöst. r
d) Der Vertrag wurde durch Konkurs bzw. Betriebsschliessung aufgelöst. r
f
f
f
f
Ich bin derzeit … nein, aber
ja geplant
... Schüler/in einer allgemeinen Schule (z.B. Gymnasium). j
... als ungelernter Arbeiter oder Angestellter beschäftigt. j
... im Militärdienst. j
... arbeitslos. j
Wie würden Sie Ihre aktuelle Situation beschreiben, falls keine der Aussagen auf Sie zutrifft?
Ich bin zurzeit  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _.
nein
g n
g n
g n
n
nein ja, in einem anderen Beruf, ja, in einem anderen Betrieb,
nämlich _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ nämlich _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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               B. Lehrbetrieb  
 
1. Denken Sie jetzt bitte an Ihren Lehrbetrieb. Wie stark treffen folgende Aussagen auf Sie zu? 
 
  
2. Wie viel Zeit nimmt Ihr Arbeitsweg normalerweise in Anspruch? (Angabe in Minuten, Tür zu Tür) 
 
 _ _ _ _ _  Minuten und ich verwende dabei meistens _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  (bitte Verkehrsmittel angeben). 
  
3. Wie hoch ist zur Zeit Ihr monatliches Grundsalär, das Ihr Arbeitgeber Ihnen bezahlt,  
 brutto in SFr pro Monat?  ! unter 800 ! 800 +  ! 900 +  ! 1’000 + ! 1’100 + ! 1’200 +  
          ! 1’300 + ! 1’400 + ! 1’500 + ! 1’600 + ! über 1’700 
 
4. Denken Sie nun zurück an die Zeit, als Sie eine Lehrstelle gesucht haben.  
Geben Sie an wie zutreffend folgende Aussagen sind. 
  
5. Hatten Sie im vergangenen Lehrjahr in Ihrem Lehrbetrieb die Möglichkeit einen Leistungslohn (Bonus für gute 
Schulnoten oder gute Leistung im Betrieb) zu erzielen? 
 !  nein    !  Falls nein, bitte weiter mit den Fragen zur Berufsfachschule – Block C. 
 !  ja 
 
6. Haben Sie selbst auch einen Leistungslohn ausbezahlt bekommen?   ! nein      ! ja     
 
 
7. Auf welches Leistungsmass bezieht sich Ihr Leistungslohn?  (Mehrfachantworten möglich) 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
8. Wann wird Ihnen dieser Leistungslohn ausbezahlt? (Mehrfachantworten möglich) 
 
 ! nach Erhalt des Jahresendzeugnisses  ! nach Erhalt des Semesterzeugnisses  
 ! zu anderen/weiteren Zeitpunkten, nämlich   _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . 
 
 
9. Wie hoch ist dieser Leistungslohn maximal? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ SFr. 
völlig
falsch
a) Mit meinem Lehrlingslohn bin ich vollkommen zufrieden. 1
b) Mein Umgang mit den Berufsbildnern und Chefs im Betrieb ist konfliktfrei. 1
c) Mein Umgang mit den Arbeitskollegen(-innen) im Betrieb ist konfliktfrei. 1
d) Ich bin mit meiner Arbeit im Betrieb häufig überfordert. 1
e) Ich bin mit meiner Arbeit im Betrieb häufig unterfordert. 1
f) Ich bleibe dem Lehrbetrieb häufig fern. 1
Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile ein Kreuz. völlig
richtig
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
ja nein
a) Notendurchschnitt im Semesterzeugnis über alle Fächer. j n
b) Notendurchschnitt im Semesterzeugnis von einzelnen Fächern, j n
nämlich _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.
c) Individuelle Leistung im Betrieb j n
d) Anderes Mass, nämlich _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. j n
völlig
falsch
a) Die Entfernung zum Lehrbetrieb war bei der Auswahl des Betriebes sehr wichtig. 1
b) Die Branche des Lehrbetriebes war bei der Auswahl des Betriebes sehr wichtig. 1
c) Das monatliche Grundsalär war bei der Auswahl des Betriebes sehr wichtig. 1
d) Bei der Lehrstellensuche war mir bekannt, dass manche Lehrbetriebe zusätzlich 1
zum monatlichen Grundsalär einen Leistungslohn (= Bonus für gute individuelle 
e) Das Vorhandensein eines solchen Leistungslohnes war mir bei der Auswahl des 1
Betriebes sehr wichtig.
Leistung) vergüten.
Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile ein Kreuz. völlig
richtig
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
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             C. Berufsfachschule   
 
1. Denken Sie jetzt bitte an Ihre Berufsfachschule. Wie stark treffen folgende Aussagen für Sie zu?  
  
2. Wenn Sie an Ihr letztes Semesterzeugnis der Berufsfachschule denken, welche Noten haben Sie erzielt? 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
3. Welche Durchschnittsnote haben Sie für den letzten Ausbildungsbericht erhalten?  
 
  
 
 
 
4. Welche Durchschnittsnote haben Sie für die letzte Prozesseinheit erhalten?  
 
  
 
 
 
              D. Persönliche Situation                                                    
 
1. Wie viele Freund/innen haben Sie zurzeit?      
 bis zu 10   10 bis 20   mehr als 20 
  !          !      ! 
 
2. Wenn Sie nun nur an Ihre fünf besten Freund/innen denken, was machen diese derzeit? 
 
3. Waren oder sind Ihre Eltern oder gute Bekannte selbstständig erwerbstätig/im Besitz einer Firma? 
 ! nein  ! ja 
 
 
Bitte weiter auf der Rückseite. 
 
völlig
falsch
a) Ich bin in der Schule häufig unterfordert. 1
b) Ich bin in der Schule häufig überfordert. 1
c) Ich stehe häufig in Konflikt mit Lehrpersonen. 1
d) Ich stehe häufig in Konflikt mit Klassenkameraden. 1
e) Ich bleibe vom Schulunterricht häufig fern. 1
Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile ein Kreuz. völlig
richtig
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
Bitte Noten aus dem letzten Semesterzeugnis eintragen.
Englisch Fach nicht besucht.
Deutsch Fach nicht besucht.
W&G (Wirtschaft Profil B & E) Fach nicht besucht.
FRW & VBR (Wirtschaft Profil M) Fach nicht besucht.
Mathematik Fach nicht besucht.
Information/Kommunikation/Administration Fach nicht besucht.
Zeugnisdurchschnitt:
Note der letzten ALS: 
Note der letzten 
Prozesseinheit: 
Bitte die zutreffenden Haupttätigkeiten der 5 besten Freunde ankreuzen. Mehrfachantworten sind möglich.
Lernender, Schüler, Student
Lehrabbrecher, Schulabbrecher
Berufstätig, nach bereits abgeschlossener Grundbildung
Berufstätig, ohne Ausbildungsabschluss
Arbeitslos
Andere Haupttätigkeit, nämlich _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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4. Wenn Sie an Ihre heutige persönliche Situation denken, wie zutreffend sind die folgenden Aussagen?  
 
 
5. Wenn Sie an Ihre berufliche Situation nach dem Abschluss Ihrer Lehre denken, also an Ihre Zukunft, wie 
   wichtig sind die folgenden Aussagen? 
 
 
6. a) Haben Sie sich schon einmal Gedanken gemacht, später eine eigene Firma zu gründen oder selbstständig    
  erwerbstätig zu sein?   ! Nein. !  Falls nein, bitte weiter mit der Frage 7. 
          ! Ja. 
 
 b) Wie konkret ist Ihre Idee für eine eigene Firma/selbstständige Erwerbstätigkeit? (Mehrfachantworten möglich) 
  ! Ich habe keine konkrete Idee für eine eigene Firma. 
  ! Ich habe bereits eine konkrete Idee für eine eigene Firma, aber noch keine Schritte unternommen. 
  ! Ich habe eine konkrete Idee für eine eigene Firma und bereits erste Schritte unternommen. 
  ! Ich habe bereits einen Geschäftsplan konkretisiert und/oder mit Kapitalgebern verhandelt. 
  ! Ich besitze bereits eine eigene Firma. 
 
7. Bitte geben Sie hier Ihre Adresse an, damit wir Ihnen im Falle eines Gewinnes den iPod touch zusenden können: 
  
 _____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Strasse, Hausnummer 
  
 _____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 PLZ und Wohnort 
 
 _____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Email 
 
8. Sind Sie im vergangenen Jahr bei Ihren Eltern ausgezogen? ! Nein  ! Ja 
 
 
 
 
 
 
sehr
unwichtig
a) Nach dem Lehrabschluss möchte ich auf meinem erlernten Beruf tätig sein. 1
b) Nach dem Lehrabschluss möchte ich eine höhere Ausbildung absolvieren. 1
c) Nach dem Lehrabschluss möchte ich möglichst ohne Unterbruch 1
 eine Beschäftigung finden.
d) Nach dem Lehrabschluss möchte ich möglichst viel Geld verdienen. 1
Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile ein Kreuz. sehrwichtig
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
völlig
falsch
a) Die meisten meiner heutigen Freunde habe ich im letzten Jahr kennen gelernt. 1
b) Für meine Schulkollegen/innen sind gute Noten sehr wichtig. 1
c) Gute Schulnoten sind mir sehr wichtig. 1
d) Ich bin mir aus heutiger Sicht sehr sicher, dass ich die Lehre abschliessen werde. 1
e) Mit meinem Leben als Ganzes bin ich sehr zufrieden. 1
f) Im letzten Jahr wurde ich von einer schlimmen familiären Veränderung 1
g) Im letzten Jahr wurde ich von einer schlimmen ausserfamiliären Veränderung 1
betroffen. (z.B. Todesfall innerhalb der Schulklasse, am Ausbildungsplatz).
h) Meine finanzielle Situation belastet mich sehr. 1
betroffen (z.B. Scheidung, Arbeitslosigkeit Vater oder Mutter, Todesfall, Krankheit).
Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile ein Kreuz. völligrichtig
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
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Wenn Sie uns noch Kommentare oder Bemerkungen zukommen lassen möchten, können Sie diese hier notieren. 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
So, nun haben Sie es geschafft. Haben Sie alle Fragen beantwortet? 
Für Ihre Mithilfe bedanken wir uns ganz herzlich! 
 
Auf Ihrem weiteren beruflichen Weg wünschen wir Ihnen alles Gute. 
 
Da es aus wissenschaftlicher Sicht interessant ist, Veränderungen über die Zeit zu beobachten, würden wir uns freuen, wenn 
wir Sie auch in Zukunft nochmals kontaktieren dürften. 
 
 
 
 
Falls Sie Fragen an uns haben, können Sie sich jederzeit bei uns melden. 
 
 
Prof. Uschi Backes-Gellner und Yvonne Oswald (yvonne.oswald@business.uzh.ch) 
Lehrstuhl für Betriebswirtschaftslehre, insbes. empirische Methodik der Arbeitsbeziehungen und der Personalökonomik 
Plattenstrasse 14 
CH-8032 Zürich 
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